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SIMPLEXITY: PLAIN LANGUAGE AND THE TAX LAW 
Joshua D. Blank∗ 
Leigh Osofsky** 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, federal government agencies have increasingly attempted 
to use plain language in written communications with the public. The Plain 
Writing Act of 2010, for instance, requires agencies to incorporate “clear and 
simple” explanations of rules and regulations into their official publications. 
In the tax context, as part of its “customer service” mission, the Internal 
Revenue Service bears a “duty to explain” the tax law to hundreds of millions 
of taxpayers who file tax returns each year. Proponents of the plain language 
movement have heralded this form of communication as leading to simplicity 
in tax compliance, more equitable access to federal programs, and increased 
open government. 
This Article casts plain language efforts in a different light. As we argue, 
rather than achieving simplicity, which would involve reform of the underlying 
law, the use of plain language to describe complex legal rules and regulations 
often yields “simplexity.” As we define it, simplexity occurs when the 
government presents clear and simple explanations of the law without 
highlighting its underlying complexity or reducing this complexity through 
formal legal changes. We show that in its numerous taxpayer publications, the 
IRS frequently uses plain language to transform complex, often ambiguous tax 
law into seemingly simple statements that: (1) present contested tax law as 
clear tax rules, (2) add administrative gloss to the tax law, and (3) fail to fully 
explain the tax law, including possible exceptions. Sometimes these plain 
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language explanations benefit the government; at other times, they benefit 
taxpayers. 
Having introduced the concept of simplexity to the legal literature, we 
show how the IRS’s use of simplexity poses a trade-off between representing 
the tax law accurately and making it understandable to the public. We offer 
approaches for preserving some of the benefits of simplexity while also 
responding to some of its drawbacks. We also forecast the likely emergence of 
simplexity in potential future tax compliance measures, such as government-
prepared tax returns, interactive tax return filing, and increased third-party 
reporting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine it is April 15th, “Tax Day,” and as the sole owner of a local pizza 
shop, you are racing to complete your annual tax return before the U.S. Post 
Office closes. Specifically, you are trying to decide whether you can claim a 
tax deduction for a $6000 expense you paid last winter to fix your restaurant’s 
copper piping, which was damaged as a result of a flood. (Your expenses for 
plumbing are usually around $3000 annually.) You understand from the owner 
of the barbecue restaurant next door that his accountant recently told him he 
could not deduct expenses for “improvements.”1 Now imagine that you read 
the following two statements, the first of which is from Treasury regulations 
and the second of which is from an IRS publication regarding business 
expenses: 
Statement 1: “Requirement to capitalize amounts paid for improvements. 
Except as provided in paragraph (h) or paragraph (n) of this 
section or under § 1.263(a)-1(f), a taxpayer generally must 
capitalize the related amounts (as defined in paragraph (g)(3) 
of this section) paid to improve a unit of property owned by 
the taxpayer.”2 
Statement 2: “Improvements. Improvements are generally major 
expenditures. Some examples are new electric wiring, a new 
roof, a new floor, new plumbing, bricking up windows to 
strengthen a wall, and lighting improvements.”3 
 
 1 I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (2012).  
 2 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)–3(d) (as amended in 2014). 
 3 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES 3 (2016). 
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As you struggle to make a decision about whether to deduct the copper piping 
expense, which of these two statements is more helpful to you? 
If you are like most people, you will most likely find Statement 2 to be far 
more helpful than Statement 1. After reading Statement 2, you may decide that 
your expense was a “major expenditure”—it was double your usual expense—
and, as a result, you cannot claim the deduction. This conclusion, however, is 
not necessarily correct. The “major expenditure” standard in Statement 2, from 
the IRS publication,4 does not appear anywhere in the Internal Revenue Code 
or Treasury regulations. Further, the provisions that Statement 1, from the 
Treasury regulations,5 references contain specific examples that provide 
support for allowing you to deduct the expense immediately.6 While 
Statement 2 may help you to make a decision regarding the deduction, this 
decision may not be consistent with the tax law. 
As this hypothetical illustrates, the IRS often attempts to explain tax law 
that consists of complex, ambiguous statutory rules and administrative 
regulations using terms that are “[c]lear and simple”7 to most taxpayers. While 
the IRS assesses and collects over three trillion dollars in tax liability annually 
as a tax enforcement agency,8 the agency also assists hundreds of millions of 
taxpayers each year9 in its dual role as a customer service organization.10 In 
this latter capacity, the IRS bears a duty to explain the tax law to taxpayers,11 
and taxpayers, likewise, possess the right to be informed by the IRS about the 
tax law.12 Further, as a result of the implementation of the Plain Writing Act of 
2010, spearheaded by Cass Sunstein in his role as Administrator of the Office 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)–3(d). 
 6 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)–3(k)(7) ex. 23 (as amended in 2014). 
 7 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM NO. M-11-15, FINAL 
GUIDANCE ON IMPLEMENTING THE PLAIN WRITING ACT OF 2010 (2013). 
 8 See The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ 
uac/the-agency-its-mission-and-statutory-authority (last updated July 27, 2016).  
 9 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 1 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2014), http://www. 
TaxpayerAdvocate.irs.gov/2014AnnualReport. 
 10 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1205, 
112 Stat. 685, 722–23 (1998); see also Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. 
REV. 971, 980 (2003) (describing congressional efforts to make the IRS more “‘customer’-friendly”). 
 11 See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-98-59, New IRS Mission Statement Emphasizes Taxpayer Service 
(Sept. 24, 1998), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-98-59.pdf; Fact Sheet FS-2015-3, Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights #1, The Right to Be Informed, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. [hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS], 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-number-1-the-right-to-be-informed (last updated 
Jan. 2015); see also infra Part II.A. 
 12 See Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-274, § 2, 124 Stat. 2861, 2861 (2010). 
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of Information and Regulatory Affairs,13 the IRS must use plain language to 
convey the tax law in “easily understandable language on all of [its] forms, 
publications, documents and notices.”14 Sunstein and others have heralded 
initiatives like the Plain Writing Act as increasing “simplicity,”15 which they 
argue enables taxpayers to self-assess their own tax liability, ensures equal 
access to information about government programs and services, and increases 
government transparency.16 As Sunstein has noted, the introduction of plain 
language in government communications should “promote clarity, because it is 
designed to ensure that when government communicates with citizens, it does 
so in a way that people can easily understand.”17 
This Article casts plain language efforts in a different light. As we argue, 
rather than achieving simplicity, which would involve reform of the underlying 
law,18 the use of plain language to describe complex legal rules and regulations 
often yields “simplexity.” As we define it, simplexity occurs when the 
government presents clear and simple explanations of the law without 
highlighting its underlying complexity or reducing this complexity through 
formal legal changes. Outside of law, simplexity is a concept that has emerged 
in recent years in diverse fields, including chemistry19 and biology,20 cognitive 
psychology,21 literary analysis,22 and even computer-animated feature films.23 
We show that in its numerous taxpayer publications, the IRS frequently uses 
plain language to transform complex, often ambiguous tax law into seemingly 
simple statements that: (1) present contested tax law as clear tax rules, (2) add 
 
 13 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 185 (2013). 
 14 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 5206, PLAIN WRITING ACT 
COMPLIANCE REPORT 2 (2015). 
 15 SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 185 (2013); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 7.  
 16 See infra Part II.C. 
 17 SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 185. 
 18 See OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, DEP’T OF TREASURY, 1 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 16 (1984); infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text. 
 19 See, e.g., Phillippe Compain, Le pari de la simplexité: Le simple et le complexe en synthèse organique 
[The Challenge of Simplexity: The Simple and the Complex in Organic Synthesis], 265 L’ACTUALITÉ 
CHIMIQUE, Apr.–May 2003, at 129, 129.  
 20 See, e.g., JEFFREY KLUGER, SIMPLEXITY: WHY SIMPLE THINGS BECOME COMPLEX (AND HOW 
COMPLEX THINGS CAN BE MADE SIMPLE) (2008). 
 21 Serge Gelalian, Is Modeling the Primary Activity of the Human Brain?, 3 PSYCHOL. RES. 175, 184 
(2013).  
 22 See, e.g., ALAIN BERTHOZ, SIMPLEXITY: SIMPLIFYING PRINCIPLES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 208 
(Giselle Weiss trans. 2012). 
 23 TIM HAUSER, THE ART OF UP 18 (2009) (quoting Pixar animator Ricky Nierva as stating, 
“[Simplexity] is the art of simplifying an image down to its essence. . . . ‘Simplexity’ is about selective 
detail”). 
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administrative gloss to the tax law, and (3) fail to fully explain the tax law, 
including possible exceptions. We refer to these descriptions as “IRS 
simplifications.” Sometimes IRS simplifications benefit the government; at 
other times, they benefit taxpayers. In either case, simplexity offers a powerful 
platform from which the government can shape taxpayers’ perceptions and 
understanding of the tax law. 
Having introduced the concept of simplexity, we explain how the IRS’s use 
of simplexity poses a trade-off between representing the tax law accurately and 
making it understandable to the public. There is no single way this trade-off 
should be resolved. Rather, resolving the trade-off will depend on value 
judgments as to whether the right balance of accuracy and understandability 
has been reached in a given case. The trade-off is animated by offsetting 
benefits and costs from simplexity. In particular, while simplexity offers a 
number of potential tax administration benefits, it can also threaten vital values 
of democratic governance and fairness.24 On the one hand, IRS simplifications 
explain otherwise complex tax law in terms that are comprehensible for a large 
swath of taxpayers. They also reveal the IRS’s own interpretation of the tax 
law and its likely auditing or litigating position in the event of a tax 
controversy. And where taxpayers respond to government-favorable IRS 
simplifications by refraining from claiming aggressive tax positions, they 
enable the IRS to increase collection of tax revenue. On the other hand, by 
describing the tax law in seemingly straightforward terms, IRS simplifications 
can have the unintended effect of obscuring individuals’ knowledge of the 
underlying tax law, as it exists in the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury 
regulations, and case law. In addition, IRS simplifications can impose unequal 
benefits and burdens on different types of taxpayers. Sophisticated taxpayers 
possess the ability to reject IRS simplifications that benefit the government, 
while all taxpayers, sophisticated and unsophisticated, will follow IRS 
simplifications that favor taxpayers. Further, administrative law does not offer 
an adequate solution to the problems posed by IRS simplifications, leaving 
significant threats of opacity and inequity largely unchecked.25 
This Article does not contend that the IRS should abandon plain language. 
Rather, we offer several strategies for maximizing the tax administration and 
compliance benefits of simplexity while minimizing its drawbacks.26 First, we 
 
 24 See infra Parts III.A and III.B. 
 25 Id.  
 26 See infra Part III.D. 
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explore the possibility of mandating that the IRS either annotate or red-flag its 
own simplifications in IRS publications.27 As we demonstrate, in addition to 
reducing opacity, these methods still allow the IRS to speak in plain language 
to taxpayers and set forth its own views, and even allow the IRS to continue to 
maximize revenue collection to the extent that conservative taxpayers follow 
the IRS’s positions. Next, we discuss how the IRS may rely on institutions or 
interest groups outside of the IRS, such as the Government Accountability 
Office, or the tax law bar, to review IRS simplifications and accompanying 
annotations and red-flagging.28 Last, we consider potential structural reform of 
the IRS, including the creation of an independent taxpayer service 
organization.29 
Finally, we forecast the likely emergence of simplexity in the future of tax 
administration.30 Tax scholars and policymakers have made a variety of 
suggestions for how tax administration can and should change in the coming 
decades. For example, scholars and policymakers have suggested that the 
government should prepare individuals’ tax returns (using information it 
already possesses),31 develop interactive tax return filing programs,32 and 
continue to expand the role of third party information reporting,33 all 
suggestions that have begun to be implemented in the tax system in varying 
degrees.34 Simplexity is likely to arise in each of these innovations. As a result, 
our suggestions for minimizing the threats while maintaining the benefits of 
simplexity will become increasingly important. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the 
IRS’s customer service obligations, including its duty to explain the tax law, 
 
 27 See infra Part III.D.1. 
 28 See infra Part III.D.2. 
 29 See infra Part III.D.3. 
 30 See infra Part III.E. 
 31 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens: The California ReadyReturn, 107 TAX 
NOTES 1431 (2005); AUSTAN GOOLSBEE, BROOKINGS INST., THE ‘SIMPLE RETURN’: REDUCING AMERICA’S 
TAX BURDEN THROUGH RETURN-FREE FILING (2006); Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax 
Defense, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 443, 528–29 (2014); Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Americans Don’t Hate Taxes, They Hate 
Paying Taxes, 44 U.B.C. L. REV. 835, 842 (2011). 
 32 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Clifford Nass & Joel Slemrod, Using the “Smart Return” to Reduce Tax 
Evasion (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2578432, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2578432; Mock & Shurtz, supra note 31; Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-Friendly Taxpaying, 
92 IND. L.J. (forthcoming). 
 33 For a list of current information-reporting requirements, see Information Return Reporting, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/information-return-reporting 
(last updated May 17, 2016).  
 34 See infra Part III.E. 
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and examines the rationale underlying the plain language movement in the tax 
context. Part II introduces the concept of simplexity to the legal literature and 
offers examples of IRS simplifications that fall into several common 
categories. Part III examines the benefits and drawbacks of simplexity, offers 
suggestions for reform, examines potential simplexity in future tax 
administration initiatives, and is followed by the Conclusion. 
I. THE DUTY TO EXPLAIN THE TAX LAW 
Among its core functions, the IRS seeks to promote voluntary compliance 
with the tax law, reviews hundreds of millions of tax returns, and assesses and 
collects over three trillion dollars in tax revenue annually.35 In recent years, the 
IRS has faced criticism regarding its exercise of tax enforcement discretion, 
such as that the agency fails to enforce the tax law in certain cases (e.g., 
refraining from taxing employees on frequent flyer miles accumulated through 
business travel),36 under-enforces the tax law (e.g., declining to audit large 
partnerships and small cash businesses),37 and enters into secret deals with 
taxpayers (e.g., advance pricing agreements that enable multinational 
corporations to reduce their global tax liability by billions of dollars).38 In 
response, several scholars have called for new institutional oversight and 
judicial review of the IRS’s exercise of discretion in enforcing the tax law.39 
In addition to its tax enforcement obligations, the IRS is also required to 
provide “customer service”40 assistance to taxpayers. The IRS bears an 
affirmative duty to assist both individuals and businesses in complying with 
their tax calculation and payment obligations, specifically by explaining the tax 
law to taxpayers in plain language that is clear and easy to understand. In 
 
 35 See The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, supra note 8. 
 36 See Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 829, 831 (2012). 
 37 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX 
NOTES 506, 514 (2007); Amy S. Elliott, Audit Proof? How Hedge Funds, PE Funds, and PTPs Escape the 
IRS, 136 TAX NOTES 351, 351–52 (2012). 
 38 See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Draft Senate Finance APA Report Shows Incompetent IRS, 2005 TAX 
NOTES TODAY, at 119-1; see also Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism About Responsive Tax Administration, 66 TAX 
L. REV. 121 (2012). 
 39 See, e.g., Samuel D. Brunson, Watching the Watchers: Preventing I.R.S. Abuse of the Tax System, 14 
FLA. TAX REV. 223, 254–55 (2013); Richard C. Stark, Hartman E. Blanchard Jr. & Saul Mezei, Consisten cy, 
Sunshine, Privacy, Secret Law, and the APA Program, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 26-3; Zelenak, supra note 36, 
at 851–53. 
 40 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1205, 112 
Stat. 685, 722–23 (1998).  
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comparison with their extensive focus on the IRS’s role as a tax enforcement 
organization, policymakers, tax scholars, and other commentators have 
devoted far less attention to the IRS’s role as a customer service organization, 
including the IRS’s approaches to fulfilling its duty to explain the tax law.41 
This Part discusses the IRS’s customer service obligations, reviews the 
agency’s multiple approaches to explaining the tax law to taxpayers, and 
considers the rationale for imposing a duty to explain upon the IRS. 
A. The IRS as Customer Service Organization 
In its customer service capacity, the IRS has a central duty to explain the 
tax law to taxpayers. As the IRS describes it, its mission is to “help the large 
majority of compliant taxpayers with the tax law, while ensuring that the 
minority who are unwilling to comply pay their fair share.”42 Notably, this 
mission statement references helping taxpayers comply before referencing tax 
enforcement.43 Explaining the tax law to taxpayers has become an important 
way in which the IRS fulfills this service mission. The IRS’s customer service 
obligations arise from several legislative and executive mandates. 
The 1998 IRS Reforms. In 1998, largely in response to perceived abuses of 
enforcement discretion by IRS officials,44 Congress enacted major reforms to 
heighten the IRS’s emphasis on “customer service.”45 Following the enactment 
of these changes, the IRS adopted a new mission statement: “[P]rovide 
America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand and meet 
their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law with integrity and fairness 
 
 41 Some commentators have focused on the importance of IRS guidance generally. See, e.g., NAT’L 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: PREFACE AND 
HIGHLIGHTS 44 (2013). Some recent work has focused on taxpayers’ legal ability to rely on IRS publications 
in support of their tax positions. See, e.g., Emily Cauble, Detrimental Reliance on IRS Guidance, 2015 WIS. L. 
REV. 421; Dashiell C. Shapiro, Can Taxpayers Rely on IRS Form Instructions?, 149 TAX NOTES 945 (2015). 
 42 The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, supra note 8. 
 43 See I.R.S. News Release IR-98-59, New IRS Mission Statement Emphasizes Taxpayer Service 
(Sept. 24, 1998), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-98-59.pdf. 
 44 See, e.g., IRS Oversight: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. 1 (1998) (statement of 
Sen. William V. Roth, Jr., Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance); Ryan J. Donmoyer, Three Days of Hearings 
Paint Picture of Troubled IRS, 76 TAX NOTES 1655, 1655–66 (1997). Later investigations revealed many of 
these stories to be exaggerated. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-82, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: ALLEGATIONS OF IRS EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT 3, 19 (1999). 
 45 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1205, 112 
Stat. 685, 722–23; see also Lederman, supra note 10, at 992–93. 
BLANK_OSOFSKY GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/10/2017 10:59 AM 
198 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:189 
to all.”46 The IRS implemented its new mission by shifting personnel and other 
resources away from tax enforcement and toward taxpayer service, making 
service of taxpayers a major part of the IRS’s role,47 a change that has lasted 
well past the 1998 IRS restructuring.48 
Plain Writing Act of 2010. Statutory developments since 1998 reinforce 
and expand the IRS’s duty to explain the tax law to taxpayers. The IRS, like 
other federal agencies, is subject to the requirements of the Plain Writing Act 
of 2010, a statutory framework that seeks “to improve the effectiveness and 
accountability of Federal agencies to the public by promoting clear 
Government communication that the public can understand and use.”49 Under 
this statute, the IRS must use “plain writing” in its communication with 
taxpayers, meaning that it must provide written explanations and instructions 
that are “clear, concise, well-organized, and follow[] other best practices 
appropriate to the subject or field and intended audience.”50 Congress 
specifically applied its plain writing framework to documents related to “filing 
taxes,” including IRS publications.51 Following enactment of the Plain Writing 
Act, IRS officials indicated that the agency would “communicate in clear, 
easily understandable language on all of our forms, publications, documents 
and notices.”52 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights. In 2014, at the urging of the National Taxpayer 
Advocate, the IRS adopted a “Taxpayer Bill of Rights,” a clear description of 
ten categories of existing rights to which taxpayers are entitled under various 
 
 46 I.R.S. News Release IR-98-59, New IRS Mission Statement Emphasizes Taxpayer Service (Sept. 24, 
1998), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-98-59.pdf. 
 47 Numerous scholars have suggested that this change has had a negative impact on the IRS’s 
enforcement capacity. See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial 
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 117–28 (2004); 
Lederman, supra note 10, at 982–90; see also DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT 
CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE 293–95 
(2003) (criticizing 1998 reforms); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-674, TAX ADMINISTRATION: 
IMPACT OF COMPLIANCE AND COLLECTION PROGRAM DECLINES ON TAXPAYERS, 10–30 (2002) (detailing post-
1998 reductions in tax enforcement). 
 48 Service remains a major part of the IRS’s mission today. See The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory 
Authority, supra note 8. 
 49 Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-274, § 2, 124 Stat. 2861, 2861 (2010); see also Exec. 
Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 13563 (2011). 
 50 Pub. L. No. 111-274, § 3(3) (2010).  
 51 Pub. L. No. 111-274, § 3(2)(A)(i). 
 52 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 14, at 2. 
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provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and other statutory authorities.53 
Starting in 2014, the IRS publicized the Taxpayer Bill of Rights on its website 
and in a special publication, Your Rights as a Taxpayer. The first of the ten 
enumerated rights is that all taxpayers possess “[t]he [r]ight to [b]e 
[i]nformed.”54 In describing this right, the IRS states that taxpayers have the 
right to “clear explanations of the laws and IRS procedures in all tax forms, 
instructions, publications, notices, and correspondence.”55 
A significant way in which the IRS helps taxpayers “understand and meet 
their tax responsibilities”56 is through the issuance of IRS publications to the 
general public. IRS publications are the primary documents that the agency 
uses to describe the tax law to individuals, small businesses, and tax 
professionals, and, as a result, they exemplify the IRS’s provision of guidance 
in service of taxpayers. IRS publications often include a variety of explanatory 
information, general guidance, definitions for important terms, and examples 
intended to show taxpayers how the law applies.57 
B. Explanation Approaches 
To satisfy its duty to explain the tax law, the IRS adopts several 
communication approaches in IRS publications. These methods result from the 
IRS’s own policies and from guidance implementing the Plain Writing Act 
(Plain Language Guidelines) issued by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget.58 
Tailoring Explanations for a Specific Audience. The IRS openly 
acknowledges that when drafting IRS publications, the agency adjusts its 
language depending on whether members of the general public or tax 
professionals are potential audience members.59 For publications that it intends 
to direct to the general public, the IRS states that the “plain language [it] use[s] 
 
 53 I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-72 (June 10, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-adopts-
taxpayer-bill-of-rights-10-provisions-to-be-highlighted-on-irsgov-in-publication-1. 
 54 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 1, YOUR RIGHTS AS A TAXPAYER: THE TAXPAYER BILL OF 
RIGHTS (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1.pdf. 
 55 Id.  
 56 I.R.S. News Release, supra note 11.  
 57 See Forms & Publications, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs (last updated 
June 28, 2016).  
 58 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 7; PLAIN LANGUAGE ACTION & INFO. NETWORK, FEDERAL 
PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDELINES, (Mar. 2011, revised May 2011), http://www.plainlanguage.gov/howto/ 
guidelines/FederalPLGuidelines/FederalPLGuidelines.pdf. 
 59 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 14, at 3. 
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for this group is clear, simple and meaningful” because “this group does not 
have a need to understand technical regulatory language.”60 When addressing 
tax professionals, such as tax accountants, tax return preparers or tax lawyers, 
the IRS includes more specialized terminology than in publications intended 
for the general public.61 
Eliminating Complexity. As part of its efforts to help taxpayers understand 
the tax law and to comply with the Plain Writing Act, the IRS attempts to 
avoid complexity in drafting IRS publications. According to the Plain 
Language Guidelines, the IRS should “translate complicated provisions into 
more manageable language”62 by avoiding discussion of complex details and 
discussions in these documents. For example, the guidelines state that the IRS 
should avoid emphasizing exceptions to the tax law because 
[w]hen you start a sentence with an introductory phrase or clause 
beginning with “except,” you almost certainly force the reader to re-
read your sentence. . . . The audience must absorb the exception, then 
the rule, and then usually has to go back to grasp the relationship 
between the two.63 
In contrast, rather than restating the tax law precisely as it appears in statutes or 
regulations, the guidelines instruct the IRS to rewrite sentences to “emphasize 
the positive.”64 Following enactment of the Plain Writing Act, the IRS has 
reported that it has rewritten and redesigned dozens of IRS publications in 
order “to improve comprehension.”65 
Evaluating the Impact on the Taxpayer and the IRS. IRS officials also 
consider the potential impact of the language they use in IRS publications on 
different parties, including the IRS itself. The Plain Language Guidelines 
suggest that when drafting IRS publications for the general public or tax 
professionals, IRS officials should ask, “What’s the best outcome for our 
audience? What do I need to say to get this outcome?”66 Likewise, the IRS is 
also instructed to consider how the text in any IRS publication may benefit the 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 PLAIN LANGUAGE ACTION & INFO. NETWORK, supra note 58, at 50. 
 63 Id. at 56.  
 64 Id. at 55. 
 65 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 14, at 4. 
 66 PLAIN LANGUAGE ACTION & INFO. NETWORK, supra note 58, at 2. 
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IRS. The guidelines instruct IRS officials to ask themselves: “What’s the best 
outcome for my agency? What do I need to say to get this outcome?”67 
While the IRS is not the only federal agency with a duty to explain the law 
through clear communication,68 several aspects of the IRS’s responsibilities 
make this duty both more challenging and impactful in the tax context than in 
other areas. First, compared to other agencies, the IRS must address more 
individuals and businesses on a regular basis through its publications.69 
According to the IRS, the agency designs its publications to be comprehensible 
to a mass audience, 150 million taxpayers annually.70 As commentators have 
observed, more U.S. citizens pay taxes each year than vote in presidential 
elections.71 Second, the tax law is arguably more complex than many other 
areas of the law. As the Joint Committee on Taxation has concluded, unique 
complexity in the federal tax law “make[s] it more difficult for the IRS to 
explain the law to taxpayers in a concise and understandable manner . . . .”72 
Last, no other federal agency requires as many individuals to self-assess their 
own compliance with the law and then file an annual report of this assessment 
with the federal government as the IRS.73 Scholars and policymakers have long 
noted that the requirement to file the annual Form 1040, the individual income 
tax return, is perhaps the most significant burden that the government imposes 
on individuals.74 The IRS thus faces a uniquely challenging and significant 
task in attempting to satisfy its duty to explain the tax law to taxpayers using 
plain language. 
 
 67 Id. (emphasis added). 
 68 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13 (regarding Plain Writing Act of 2010); see also David Zaring, Best 
Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 296–97 (2006) (discussing extensive use of “best practices” by federal 
agencies).  
 69 See, e.g., Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 494–95 (1943) (“No other branch of the law touches 
human activities at so many points.”). 
 70 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 14, at 4. 
 71 See Joshua D. Rosenberg, A Helpful and Efficient IRS: Some Simple and Powerful Suggestions, 88 KY. 
L.J. 33, 37 (1999); see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-3-01, STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE 
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF 
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 4 (2001).  
 72 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-26-01, TESTIMONY OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
TAXATION CONCERNING A STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION 5 (2001). For further discussion, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE 
DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 49 (1997) (addressing complexity of income tax system); Mock & 
Shurtz, supra note 31, at 524–25; Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and 
Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121, 123 (1989). 
 73 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 8–10. 
 74 See, e.g., id. at 8; see also Thomas, supra note 32, at 19.  
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C. In Praise of Plain Language 
The effort to mandate that the IRS, among other federal agencies, use plain 
language in communications with taxpayers in general publications has 
received widespread praise.75 Proponents of the legislation characterized it as 
representing “common-sense change”76 that could be “implemented at low 
cost.”77 Others predicted that efforts such as this would force federal 
government agencies to replace “bureaucratic gobbledygook”78 with “easy-to-
understand language”79 throughout their communications. The Plain Writing 
Act was enacted with overwhelming bipartisan support in 2010. While some 
scholars have begun to study the efficacy of the Plain Writing Act 
empirically,80 and others have questioned whether such policies will indeed 
make the law more “understandable,”81 there has been limited, if any, 
opposition to the primary objectives motivating these plain language 
initiatives. Each of the objectives is described briefly below. 
Simplicity and Self-Assessment. The primary rationale for mandating that 
the IRS communicate with taxpayers using plain language is that the approach 
will result in simplicity, which, in turn, will assist taxpayers in self-assessing 
their tax liability and filing their tax returns. Cass Sunstein, the primary 
architect of the Plain Writing Act in his role as head of OIRA, has argued that 
“[c]lear and simple communication . . . makes it easier for members of the 
public to understand and to apply for important benefits and services for which 
they are eligible.”82 Sunstein describes the primary rationale for this initiative 
as follows: “Simply put, the principle is this: Avoid ambiguity and be specific 
about the favored path.”83 In the tax context, Sunstein has further noted that the 
IRS should provide plain language explanations and instructions in order to 
 
 75 See, e.g., Joe Davidson, Hiring Officials Have Finally Heard the Magic Word: Résumés, WASH. POST, 
May 12, 2010, at B3. 
 76 Press Release, Office of Rep. Bruce Braley, Braley Introduces “Plain Language in Health Insurance 
Act” to Lower Costs, Cut Confusion, June 25, 2009, http://www.plainlanguage.gov/news/index.cfm?topic= 
ysnHealth. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Katy Steinmetz, Government Officials May Be Using Less Mumbo Jumbo, TIME (Jan. 27, 2015), 
http://time.com/3685016/government-plain-writing-2014/. 
 79 Press Release, Office of Rep. Bruce Braley, supra note 76. 
 80 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart & Cheryl Blake, The Problem with Words: Plain 
Language and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1358 (2015) (finding mixed 
success of the Plain Writing Act). 
 81 See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE 
OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 122 (2014). 
 82 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 7.  
 83 SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 78. 
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“assist the public in complying with applicable requirements simply because 
people better understand what they are supposed to do.”84 An undisputable 
objective of the plain language movement is to make this burden of tax 
compliance as simple and “painless as possible.”85 Indeed, the IRS has 
expressed Sunstein’s sentiments in the first words of the Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights, stating that “[t]axpayers have the right to know what they need to do to 
comply with the tax laws.”86 Plain language is central to the IRS’s commitment 
that taxpayers enjoy this right. 
Equity. The plain language movement also seeks to reduce the potential for 
vague tax laws to result in inequitable distribution of tax benefits and burdens 
among taxpayers. Without clear explanations of the tax law, plain language 
advocates argue, some taxpayers may fail to take advantage of government 
benefits for which they may be eligible, such as the Earned Income Tax 
Credit87 or the Child Tax Credit.88 As Sunstein has suggested, “[a] lack of 
clarity may prevent people from becoming sufficiently aware of programs or 
services, and . . . may discourage participation.”89 Conversely, plain language 
advocates suggest that without clear instructions from the IRS, some 
sophisticated taxpayers may attempt to exploit ambiguities in the tax law to 
claim tax benefits that Congress never intended. For example, Nina Olson, 
National Taxpayer Advocate, has reported that without clear guidance, 
“sophisticated taxpayers often find loopholes that enable them to reduce or 
eliminate their tax liabilities.”90 Equity concerns, consequently, have played a 
significant role in motivating the IRS’s duty to explain the tax law to the 
public. 
Transparency. A final impetus for the IRS to use plain language is that this 
approach may strengthen government transparency. With access to plain 
language descriptions of the tax laws, plain language advocates suggest, 
citizens can better understand the actions of Congress, the Treasury, and the 
 
 84 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 7.  
 85 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 5. 
 86 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11.  
 87 I.R.C. § 32 (2012). 
 88 I.R.C. § 24 (2012). 
 89 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM M-11-05, 
PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE FOR THE PLAIN WRITING ACT OF 2010 (2010). 
 90 Michelle Singletary, Congress Should Resolve to Simplify the Tax Code, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2009, at 
D2 (quoting Nina Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate). 
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IRS.91 They can react to this enhanced knowledge either by accepting or by 
questioning the tax laws through public discussion and debate. As Sunstein 
noted following the enactment of the Plain Writing Act in 2010, plain language 
“should be seen as an essential part of open government.”92 
II. SIMPLEXITY IN IRS PUBLICATIONS 
There is another side to plain language. While proponents of plain language 
argue that it will lead to greater simplicity and administrability of the tax 
system,93 the initiative does not make substantive changes to the myriad 
complexities of the tax law—technical details, exceptions (and exceptions to 
exceptions), and ambiguous statutory and judicial language. In this Part, we 
argue that the IRS’s efforts to incorporate plain language into its 
communications with taxpayers result not in greater simplicity, but instead in 
simplexity. Whereas simplicity eliminates complexity, simplexity offers only 
the appearance of simplicity. 
As we show, following an extensive review of IRS publications, the IRS 
routinely offers descriptions of the tax law that exhibit simplexity. IRS 
publications transform complex, often ambiguous tax law into seemingly 
simple, straightforward statements (which we describe as “IRS 
simplifications”). Sometimes IRS simplifications benefit the government. At 
other times, they benefit taxpayers. In any event, the mandate to describe the 
tax law using plain language provides the IRS with a unique and influential 
ability to shape taxpayers’ and tax practitioners’ perceptions and understanding 
of the tax law. 
This Part introduces the concept of simplexity to the tax literature, provides 
examples in IRS publications that fall into several common categories, and 
shows how taxpayers who complete their tax returns in various different ways 
are repeatedly exposed to simplexity. 
 
 91 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 89 (“Transparency, public participation, and 
collaboration cannot easily occur without plain writing.”); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 13; Joel Siegel, 
Obama Signs ‘Plain Writing’ Law, ABCNEWS (Oct. 17, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/obama-signs-law-
understand/story?id=11902841 (quoting Rep. Bruce Braley, D-Iowa, as stating that “plain language will 
increase government accountability”). 
 92 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 89. 
 93 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 185. 
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A. What Is Simplexity? 
While there is no universal definition of simplexity, representative 
descriptions include “the process of simplifying something by obscuring the 
more complex aspects of the original goal”94 and “an idea, or concept that 
appears to be simple to understand, yet is very complex in it’s [sic] true 
description.”95 In this subpart, we distinguish simplexity from simplicity, 
provide several examples of simplexity in non-legal contexts, and define our 
usage of the term in this Article. 
Before defining simplexity, it is necessary to consider simplicity. The 
dictionary definition of simplicity refers to the “state of being simple, 
uncomplicated, or uncompounded.”96 In his recent book, Simpler: The Future 
of Government, Cass Sunstein notes that the overarching goal of the “large-
scale transformation in American government”97 that occurred as a result of 
initiatives such as the Plain Writing Act was to “increase simplicity”98 through 
the government’s communications with the public. In the context of 
fundamental tax reform, government officials have defined simplicity in the 
negative by stating that it is “not reflected in [taxpayers] . . . . computing 
dozens of deductions and credits, and wondering all the while whether other 
means of saving tax might have been missed through ignorance of the laws.”99 
Simplicity, according to this description, occurs when the government reforms 
or designs the tax law by “eliminat[ing] and avoid[ing] provisions that would 
unduly complicate tax administration and compliance for most taxpayers.”100 
Simplicity is, thus, the antithesis of complexity, or, as Sunstein has posited, 
“simplicity is friendly, and complexity is not.”101 
Simplexity is distinct from simplicity in that simplexity refers to a concept 
that appears to be simple, but that nonetheless retains underlying complexity. 
As neurophysiologist Alain Berthoz has written, “[s]implexity is not 
simplicity. It is fundamentally linked with complexity, with which it shares 
 
 94 Simplexity, COLLINS DICTIONARY, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/submission/1290/Simplexity (last 
updated July 20, 2012). 
 95 Simplexity, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Simplexity (last 
updated Nov. 19, 2006). 
 96 Simplicity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/simplicity (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2016). 
 97 SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 2. 
 98 Id.  
 99 See OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, supra note 18, at 15–16.  
 100 Id. at 16. 
 101 SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 1. 
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common roots.”102 A few examples illustrate the appearance of simplexity 
outside of law. Scientists have used the term to describe the appearance of 
phenomena whose simplicity obscures underlying complexity, such as a 
seemingly simple houseplant, whose simple green leaves obscure its 
underlying “microhydraulics and fine-tuned metabolism and dense schematic 
of nucleic acids.”103 Similarly, psychology researchers have referred to 
simplexity as a “cognitive process that compresses information and synthesizes 
it without losing its complexity.”104 Commentators have noted that certain 
literary forms, such as metaphors and fables, are simplex as their accessible 
narrative conceals deeper, underlying meaning.105 For instance, Berthoz has 
argued that simplexity occurs in characters such as the seven dwarves, for 
“Dopey is not as dopey as he seems” because he is “not a village idiot but a 
witness and wise presence . . . .”106 In another artistic setting, simplexity has 
become a foundational principle of Pixar Animation Studios, producer of 
acclaimed computer-animated feature films.107 As one of its lead animators has 
stated, the studio’s artists strive to achieve simplexity by “simplifying an 
image down to its essence,”108 which causes complexity of texture, design and 
detail to be “masked by how simple the form is.”109 
We now offer our definitions of terms that we apply throughout the 
remainder of this Article. While tax scholars frequently discuss 
“simplification” as a normative goal of tax design and reform,110 we define 
simplification as resulting in two distinct possibilities, “simplicity” and 
“simplexity.” We define “simplicity” as occurring when policymakers reform 
the law by eliminating specific complex provisions or procedures through 
enactment of statutory changes or issuance of regulations. For instance, we 
would consider a tax system that repeals specific complex deductions or 
statutory exceptions or that exempts millions of low-income taxpayers from 
filing tax returns at all as one that exhibits simplicity. In contrast, we define 
 
 102 BERTHOZ, supra note 22, at x. 
 103 KLUGER, supra note 20, at 11. 
 104 Gelalian, supra note 21, at 185. 
 105 See, e.g., BERTHOZ, supra note 22, at 208 (“Metaphor . . . is a wonderful way of shortcutting 
language.”). 
 106 Id.  
 107 See HAUSER, supra note 23, at 18. 
 108 Id. (quoting Pixar animator Ricky Nierva). 
 109 Id. 
 110 See Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1974); Joel Slemrod, 
The Return to Tax Simplification: An Econometric Analysis, 17 PUB. FIN. REV. 3, 3 (1989); supra note 99 and 
accompanying text. 
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“simplexity” as resulting when the government offers clear and simple 
explanations of the law without highlighting its underlying complexity or 
reducing this complexity through formal legal changes. We refer to such 
explanations and descriptions as “IRS simplifications.” 
B. Categories and Examples 
Simplexity pervades IRS publications. The IRS frequently attempts to 
describe the tax law in simplified terms in IRS publications, which are 
intended for both the general public and tax professionals, after considering 
likely effects on taxpayers and the IRS itself. As this subpart shows, IRS 
simplifications can be grouped into three categories, based on descriptions that: 
(1) present contested tax law as clear tax rules, (2) add administrative gloss to 
the tax law, and (3) fail to fully explain the tax law, including possible 
exceptions. 
1. Presenting Contested Tax Law as Clear Tax Rules 
As tax lawyers, accountants, and law students are well aware, the judiciary 
plays an important role in interpreting the tax law.111 The judiciary’s 
involvement in interpreting the tax law often underscores, and, at times, even 
increases the ambiguity regarding the tax law’s meaning. The examples below 
illustrate how the IRS often presents tax positions that are the subject of 
judicial ambiguity as if they are unambiguous tax rules. 
a. Deductibility of Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses 
A classic example of an ambiguous tax law provision is the deduction for 
“ordinary and necessary” trade or business expenses incurred during the 
taxable year.112 In order to determine whether a taxpayer can deduct expenses 
as trade or business expenses, the taxpayer must determine that such expenses 
are both “ordinary” and “necessary.”113 Explaining what, exactly, these terms 
mean is a famously difficult task. For example, in attempting to articulate the 
standard for deductibility of business expenses, Justice Cardozo stated that 
 
 111 See Leandra Lederman, What Do Courts Have to Do With It?: The Judiciary’s Role in Making Federal 
Tax Law, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 899, 899 (2012). 
 112 I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (2016). 
 113 Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 497 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933). 
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“[o]ne struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready 
touchstone.”114 
IRS Simplification. Despite this inherent legal ambiguity, the IRS uses an 
IRS publication as a vehicle for providing a ready, albeit overly clear, 
touchstone to taxpayers. The IRS presents taxpayers with a straightforward 
summary of the test for deductibility of business expenses in IRS 
Publication 535 (Business Expenses).115 In this publication, the IRS states that 
“a business expense must be both ordinary and necessary” to be deductible.116 
With respect to the “ordinary” prong, Publication 535 instructs taxpayers that 
“[a]n ordinary expense is one that is common and accepted in your 
industry.”117 This definition imposes on taxpayers the obligation to determine 
whether other taxpayers operating similar businesses—the taxpayer’s 
“industry”—incur the expense at issue in their business practices (i.e., whether 
the expense is “common and accepted”).118 
Tax Law. In contrast to the clear rule expressed in the IRS publication, 
courts have exhibited differing approaches to what satisfies the “ordinary” 
requirement. Several courts have adopted the view expressed in IRS 
Publication 535 by asking whether other similarly-situated taxpayers have 
incurred the business expense at issue.119 Yet other courts have stated 
explicitly that taxpayers may treat business expenses as ordinary even if few or 
no other similarly-situated taxpayer in the relevant industry incurs this 
expense.120 As one court held, a taxpayer “should not be penalized taxwise for 
his business ingenuity in [incurring business expenses] which do not conform 
to the practices of one whom he is naturally trying to surpass in profits.”121 
Some courts have similarly looked askance, finding that the percentage of 
taxpayers in an industry that has incurred a specific expense is irrelevant to 
whether an expense is ordinary.122 And in internal memoranda, even IRS 
 
 114 Welch, 290 U.S. at 115. 
 115 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 3. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See, e.g., Reffett v. Comm’r, 39 T.C. 869, 878–89 (1963) (considering whether other coal operators 
paid same contingent witness fees as taxpayer). 
 120 See, e.g., United Title Ins. v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 34, 45 (1988) (holding that even if taxpayer 
were only one to incur certain expenses, “that in itself would not mean the expenses were not ordinary within 
the meaning of section 162(a)”). 
 121 Poletti v. Comm’r, 330 F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 1964). 
 122 Brizell v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 151, 158–59 (1989) (“We reject the suggestion that a given percentage of 
an industry must pay or incur a certain expense in order for the expense to be ordinary.”). 
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officials have concluded that expenses may satisfy the ordinary prong despite 
the fact that they are not common practice because “[t]hat which today is a 
novel method of generating business may be commonplace tomorrow.”123 
In even starker conflict with the IRS’s characterization of the “ordinary” 
prong in Publication 535, some courts have held that the “ordinary” prong is 
simply meant to clarify that, even though an expense may be necessary, it may 
not be deductible in the year in question because the expense may relate to the 
production of income in future tax years.124 For instance, in one decision, the 
Supreme Court found that the “principal function of the term ‘ordinary’ in 
§ 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between those expenses 
that are currently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital 
expenditures . . . .”125 Citing this language, other courts have refrained from 
considering whether an expense is “common and accepted” in the taxpayer’s 
industry.126 
Taxpayer Effects. Despite the differing judicial interpretations of the term 
ordinary under § 162(a) of the Code, Publication 535 presents the taxpayer 
with an unequivocal definition of an ordinary expense as one that is common 
and accepted in the taxpayer’s industry.127 Taxpayers who apply the clear rule 
stated in IRS Publication 535 may reasonably conclude they are not entitled to 
claim business expense deductions, even if they would have been entitled to do 
so under one of the alternative judicial interpretations. For example, assume a 
baker pays legal fees to retain an attorney to defend the baker against claims of 
food poisoning by customers. Under IRS Publication 535, if the baker cannot 
identify other owners of bakeries who have paid similar legal fees, the baker 
should conclude that this expense does not satisfy the ordinary standard and, 
consequently, should forego a business expense deduction.128 A more 
comprehensive understanding of potentially applicable case law may have 
encouraged the baker to claim the deduction.129 The forgone deduction would 
most likely increase the tax liability of the baker. 
 
 123 I.R.S. Field Service Advisory, 1996 WL 33320948 (Sept. 18, 1996). 
 124 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689–70 (1966). 
 125 Id. at 689. 
 126 See, e.g., Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Comm’r, 736 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 127 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 3. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text. 
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b. Deductibility of Home Mortgage Refinancing Points 
The IRS publication regarding the deductibility of home mortgage 
“refinancing points” provides another example of an IRS simplification that 
presents contested tax law as a clear tax rule.130 Homeowners with mortgages 
may pay “points” to their lenders in order to reduce their mortgage interest 
rate.131 When these homeowners pay points, they may wonder whether they 
can deduct them in the year of payment. After all, such points essentially 
represent prepaid interest, and home mortgage interest is tax deductible, 
subject to various limitations. Further, the Code explicitly allows taxpayers to 
claim a tax deduction for “points paid in respect of any indebtedness incurred 
in connection with the purchase or improvement of, and secured by, the 
principal residence of the taxpayer . . . .”132 Yet the statutory language does not 
offer the taxpayer guidance regarding the deductibility of points that are 
incurred purely to refinance an existing mortgage rather than to purchase a new 
home or improve an existing one.133 
IRS Simplification. To fill this statutory void, the IRS provides clear 
guidance to taxpayers regarding whether and when refinancing points are 
deductible. In IRS Publication 936 (Home Mortgage Interest Deduction), the 
IRS states: 
Generally, points you pay to refinance a mortgage are not deductible 
in full in the year you pay them. This is true even if the new 
mortgage is secured by your main home. 
However, if you use part of the refinanced mortgage proceeds to 
improve your main home and you meet the first 6 tests listed under 
Deduction Allowed in Year Paid, you can fully deduct the part of the 
points related to the improvement in the year you paid them with 
your own funds.134 
In other words, the IRS advises taxpayers that they are not entitled to claim 
current-year tax deductions for refinancing points, unless the taxpayer uses 
proceeds from the refinancing to improve the home. Rather than deduct 
 
 130 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 936, HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST 
DEDUCTION 7 (2015). 
 131 Id. at 5 (“The term ‘points’ is used to describe certain charges paid, or treated as paid, by a borrower to 
obtain a home mortgage.”). For an example of refinancing points, see Buying Points to Lower Your Refinance 
Rate, BANK OF AMERICA, https://www.bankofamerica.com/home-loans/refinance/understanding-your-new-
payment/buying-points-lower-interest-rate.go (last visited Aug. 13, 2016). 
 132 I.R.C. § 461(g)(2) (2012). 
 133 Id. 
 134 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 130, at 7. 
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refinancing points, the IRS states that taxpayers must amortize them over the 
life of the loan.135 
Tax Law. While the IRS presents the tax law as an unambiguous rule, the 
case law regarding this issue is not as clear. The description in IRS 
Publication 936 is the IRS’s own position.136 However, the IRS’s view is not 
necessarily correct. For instance, in Huntsman v. Commissioner, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that refinancing points were immediately 
deductible in a situation in which the refinancing was an integrated step in 
obtaining permanent financing.137 The IRS expressed its disagreement with 
this conclusion and its intention not to follow the Eight Circuit’s decision 
outside the Eighth Circuit.138 
The IRS does not signal the existence of this contrary court authority to the 
taxpayer in IRS Publication 936, instead simply setting forth the IRS’s own 
position as the rule. The IRS does preface its description of the rule with the 
word “generally.”139 However, the word “generally” does not provide any 
indication of the controversy surrounding the IRS’s position, or the IRS’s 
defeat in pressing the issue in court.140 Rather, the word “generally” seems to 
introduce the unrelated set of exceptions in the following sentence.141 Even if 
the word “generally” is meant to signal some sort of exception to the general 
rule that the IRS sets forth in the first sentence, it is an oblique reference at 
best. To anything but the most trained eye, this IRS simplification presents the 
IRS’s contested view as the rule. 
Taxpayer Effects. For taxpayers who are questioning whether to deduct 
refinancing points, the relevant IRS publication provides straightforward 
guidance: such points are not deductible in the year paid unless the refinancing 
proceeds are used to improve the home. Taxpayers, therefore, may forego 
current deductions, even though some courts may respect such deductions 
under certain conditions. Alternatively, a taxpayer may choose to spend the 
proceeds of a home mortgage refinancing on home improvement expenses in 
 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Rev. Rul. 87-22, 1987-1 C.B. 146 (setting forth the IRS’s position). 
 137 905 F.2d 1182, 1185–86 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 138 Hunstman v. Comm’r, 905 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1990), action on dec., 1991-02 (Feb. 11, 1991). 
 139 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 130, at 7. 
 140 See Huntsman v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 917 (1988), rev’d, 905 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1990). For further 
discussion, see James E. Tierney, Pointing the Way Through Section 461(g): The Deductibility of Points Paid 
in Connection with the Acquisition or Improvement of a Principal Residence, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1095 (1992). 
 141 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 130, at 7. 
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order to ensure immediate deductibility of the refinancing points. If the 
taxpayer would not otherwise pursue the home improvement, the IRS 
publication would distort the taxpayer’s behavior, resulting in inefficiency. 
Taxpayers who forego immediate deductions of the home mortgage 
refinancing points may still deduct the refinancing points over the term of the 
loan.142 But, for many taxpayers, immediate, full deductibility is more 
beneficial than prolonged, partial deductibility over a period of years.143 As a 
result, this IRS simplification may have adverse tax consequences for many 
taxpayers. 
c. Tax Characterization of Leveraged Leases 
The IRS’s description of “leveraged leases” provides a final example of an 
IRS simplification that turns contested tax law into a clear rule.144 Leveraged 
leases are a common form of financing business assets that typically involves 
three actors: a lessee (an operating business such as a manufacturer or airline), 
a lessor (such as an investment fund), and a creditor (a bank).145 The lessor 
purchases business assets using heavy debt financing from the creditor. The 
lessor then leases the business assets to the lessee. The motivation for the 
lessor to purchase the business assets is that the lessor will claim tax 
deductions for depreciation of the business assets. The central legal question 
raised by this transaction is whether the lessor is properly characterized as the 
owner of the leased business assets for tax purposes, which would entitle it to 
the depreciation tax deductions.146 
IRS Simplification. To address this question, in IRS Publication 535 
(Business Expenses), the IRS warns taxpayers that “[l]everaged lease 
transactions may not be considered leases.”147 As a result, it suggests that 
 
 142 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 143 See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
1113, 1152 (1974); Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money”, 95 YALE L.J. 
506 (1986); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Timing of Taxes, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 499 (1986). 
 144 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 9. 
 145 See James C. Ahlstrom, Iris C. Engelson & Victor Sirelson, The Economics of Leveraged Leasing, in 1 
EQUIPMENT LEASING–LEVERAGED LEASING 6-2 (Ian Shrank & Arnold G. Gough, Jr., eds., 4th ed. 2008). 
 146 For examples of judicial controversy over whether a lease should be respected, see Frank Lyon Co. v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008); Transamerica 
Corp. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 441 (1985). For further discussion, see Charles I. Kingson, The Continued 
Confusion over Tax Ownership, 93 TAX NOTES 409 (2001); Alex Raskolnikov, Contextual Analysis of Tax 
Ownership, 85 B.U. L. REV. 431 (2005); Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in Lyon’s Den: A Failure of 
Judicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1981) (criticizing Frank Lyon Co.). 
 147 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 9. 
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taxpayers should consider seeking a private letter ruling from the IRS 
addressing the tax treatment of the leveraged lease.148 The IRS states that 
taxpayers must meet several requirements to secure a ruling that the transaction 
is, in fact, a lease: (1) “[t]he lessor must maintain a minimum unconditional ‘at 
risk’ equity investment in the property,” which the IRS defines as at least 20% 
of the property’s cost, (2) “[t]he lessee may not have a contractual right to buy 
the property from the lessor” at a discounted price, (3) “[t]he lessee may not 
invest in the property, except as provided” in other IRS guidance, (4) “[t]he 
lessee may not lend any money to the lessor to buy the property,” and (5) 
“[t]he lessor must show that it expects to receive” an economic profit, absent 
tax consequences, from the transaction.149 
Tax Law. While the IRS publication presents taxpayers with clear 
guidelines, the issue of whether a lease should be respected for tax purposes is 
highly contestable and fact-specific. In several cases, courts have rejected the 
IRS’s argument that the taxpayer failed to enter into a true lease merely 
because the taxpayer did not meet the guidelines described in IRS 
Publication 535. For instance, in Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, the Tax 
Court rejected the IRS’s application of the 20% equity investment guideline.150 
In another decision, the Tax Court stated explicitly that it was not “obligated to 
adhere” to the IRS’s guidelines.151 Other judicial decisions have disregarded 
the IRS’s guideline that lessees may not lend money to the lessor without 
threatening the lessor’s ability to claim ownership of property.152 Indeed, 
summarizing courts’ reactions to the guidelines, one commentator has stated, 
courts “have not accorded [them] much significance either as a body of logic 
or as a viable summary of legal precedents.”153 
Taxpayer Effects. One could argue that IRS Publication 535 merely 
catalogues what the IRS requires in order to offer taxpayers a private letter 
ruling that the IRS will, in fact, treat a transaction as a lease. But by describing 
its own guidelines in Publication 535 without mentioning any of the judicial 
doubt about such guidelines, IRS Publication 535 creates a belt-and-suspenders 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 84 T.C. 412, 440 & n.51 (1985). 
 151 Boyce v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-100, at 4 (2010). 
 152 See, e.g., Lansburgh v. Comm’r, 54 T.C.M. 691, 697 (1987) (respecting lease where lessee provided 
loan to lessor); L.W. Hardy Co. v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1540, 1552 (1987) (respecting lease where 
lessee provided loan to lessor); see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 8046013 (Aug. 8, 1980) (respecting lease 
where lessee agreed to reimburse lessor under certain circumstances). 
 153 Toby Cozart, Equipment Leasing: Substance and Form, TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) 544 (2009). 
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type of advantage for the IRS’s own view of the law. Specifically, the IRS uses 
Publication 535 to highlight its own guidelines as a distillation of the relevant 
factors that taxpayers should consider, despite conflicting case law. While 
some savvy taxpayers may go on to research judicial alternatives, many others 
may simply accept the IRS’s view. This IRS simplification, thus, can shape 
some taxpayers’ and advisors’ perceptions of the tax law in ways that are 
consistent with the IRS’s views. 
2. Adding Administrative Gloss to the Tax Law 
Another example of simplexity occurs when the IRS adds its own 
administrative gloss to the tax law as it describes the applicable tax law. As the 
examples below demonstrate, these additions of administrative gloss can result 
in representations of the tax law that deviate from relevant provisions of the 
Code, Treasury regulations, and case law. 
a. Capitalization of Improvements 
The IRS’s description of the rules regarding capitalization of improvements 
is an illustration of the IRS’s propensity to add administrative gloss to the tax 
law.154 If a taxpayer incurs an expense “for new buildings or for permanent 
improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or 
estate,” current law provides that the taxpayer may not deduct this expense 
currently, but instead must capitalize the expense and claim depreciation tax 
deductions, which reflect the decline in value of this capitalized expense each 
year, in accordance with a fixed schedule.155 On the other hand, if the taxpayer 
incurs an expense merely to maintain or repair property, the taxpayer may be 
entitled to claim a full deduction immediately.156 While the relevant statute 
directly addresses certain expenditures, such as costs incurred to construct a 
new building, it does not directly address the deductibility of most business 
expenses.157 
IRS Simplification. In its publication regarding capitalization, the IRS 
provides a general standard and several specific examples to assist taxpayers. 
The IRS states in Publication 535 (Business Expenses) that improvements, 
 
 154 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 3. 
 155 I.R.C. § 263(a) (2012); see also I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (2012) (depreciation). 
 156 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4(a) (2014) (allowing the taxpayer to deduct amounts paid for “repairs and 
maintenance to tangible property”). 
 157 I.R.C. § 263(a) (referring only to items for which “no deduction shall be allowed”). 
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which must be capitalized, are “generally major expenditures.”158 After 
providing this general standard, the IRS then says that “[s]ome examples are 
new electric wiring, a new roof, a new floor, new plumbing, bricking up 
windows to strengthen a wall, and lighting improvements.”159 
Tax Law. This example represents an addition of administrative gloss 
because the “major expenditure” standard does not appear in the tax law itself. 
Whether a taxpayer’s purchase or investment represents an improvement has 
historically been the subject of significant judicial controversy, with little 
uniformity in the decisions.160 In 2013, in order to “reduce the controversy in 
this area,” the Treasury issued final regulations that directly address whether a 
taxpayer’s purchase of services or property is an improvement.161 Rather than 
setting forth a general standard for identifying an improvement, the regulations 
state that one must consider “all of a taxpayer’s particular facts and 
circumstances.”162 Specifically, the regulations provide that in order to 
determine whether an expense is necessitated by normal wear and tear, which 
is deductible, or a permanent improvement, which is subject to capitalization, 
the taxpayer should consider the condition of the property at issue immediately 
prior to and after its repair.163 The regulations focus on whether the 
expenditure enables the taxpayer to keep its asset in normal operating 
condition, but do not apply the “major expenditure” standard of IRS 
Publication 535.164 
In addition, the examples that the IRS provides in Publication 535 elide the 
complexity of the underlying law. For instance, IRS Publication 535 describes 
“new electric wiring” as an example of the general standard that 
“[i]mprovements are generally major expenditures.”165 This example is curious 
 
 158 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 3. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See, e.g., Moss v. Comm’r, 831 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing business deduction for expenses 
incurred in conjunction with improvement plan); Cinergy Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 489 (2003) 
(allowing business deduction for encapsulation and removal of asbestos); Norwest Corp. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 
265 (1997) (disallowing business deduction for asbestos removal); Oberman Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 47 T.C. 471 
(1967) (allowing business deduction for roof removal, replacement, and expansion). As the Treasury has 
acknowledged, this area has “resulted in considerable controversy between taxpayers and the IRS over many 
years.” T.D. 9636, 2013-43 I.R.B. 331, 332.  
 161 T.D. 9636, 2013-43 I.R.B. 331, 332. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(j)(2)(iv) (2016). 
 164 A review of the final § 263 regulations does not show use of the term “major expenditure.” We 
confirmed our reading of the regulations with a Westlaw search for the terms: “major expenditure” or “major 
expenditures” w/20 improvement!.  
 165 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 3. 
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because there is a specific example in the regulations, which provides that 
replacement of as much as 30% of a building’s electrical wiring does not 
represent a non-deductible restoration.166 As another illustration, while IRS 
Publication 535 broadly states that “new plumbing” is an example of the 
general standard that “[i]mprovements are generally major expenditures,”167 a 
specific example in the regulations describes how a taxpayer’s replacement of 
eight out of twenty sinks in bathrooms does not constitute an improvement.168 
Indeed, several of the specific examples of business expenses that IRS 
Publication 535 describes as improvements that must be capitalized are also 
presented in specific examples in the applicable regulations as repairs that may 
be deducted immediately.169 
Taxpayer Effects. By adding administrative gloss to the tax law in its 
taxpayer publication regarding capitalization, the IRS may lead taxpayers to 
claim tax positions that are different from the treatment required by current 
law. 
Returning to the example at the beginning of this Article, assume a chef, 
who owns his own restaurant, normally incurs a $10,000 annual expense to 
repair copper piping in his restaurant. In one year, the chef incurs a $20,000 
expense to repair the pipes as a result of a global shortage of copper. Applying 
the IRS’s standard in IRS Publication 535, the chef may reasonably conclude 
that as a result of its magnitude, the $20,000 expense should be treated as a 
“major expenditure,” which therefore is not deductible. However, applying the 
Treasury regulations’ actual before-and-after approach, if the expense simply 
enables the chef to repair normal wear and tear to his business assets, the chef 
should be entitled to deduct the $20,000 expense, even if it is substantially 
higher than the expense to repair the pipes in prior years.170 
Alternatively, assume the chef pays $5000 to completely replace a brick 
oven in his restaurant, a small amount compared to all of his annual business 
expenses of $200,000. Applying the “major expenditure” standard, it is 
possible that the chef would claim a deduction for this amount currently, as the 
amount only represents 2.5% of his annual business expenses.171 A review of 
the Treasury regulations, however, shows that this expense does not represent 
 
 166 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(k)(7) ex. 21 (2016). 
 167 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 3. 
 168 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(k)(7) ex. 23. 
 169 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(k)(7) ex. 21 (wiring), ex. 23 (plumbing). 
 170 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(j)(2)(iv) (2016). 
 171 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 3. 
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mere maintenance, and instead, should be capitalized rather than deducted 
currently.172 
As these scenarios show, the administrative gloss regarding capitalization 
in IRS Publication 535 can cause taxpayers to forego business expense 
deductions that may be allowable under the relevant regulations or, 
alternatively, to claim tax deductions for expenses that must be capitalized 
under the relevant regulations. In either case, applying the IRS’s simplification 
may cause taxpayers to deviate from the applicable tax law. 
b. Exclusion of Gain from Sale of Principal Residence 
The IRS’s guidance to taxpayers regarding the exclusion from taxable 
income of gain from the sale of a principal residence is another example of the 
IRS’s addition of administrative gloss to the text of a statute or Treasury 
regulation.173 Under current law, individual taxpayers can exclude a portion of 
their realized gains upon selling their principal residence (up to $250,000 for 
single individuals and $500,000 for married couples), if they meet certain 
requirements.174 Namely, taxpayers must have owned and occupied the 
residence as their principal residence for at least two years during the five-year 
period immediately prior to the sale.175 If taxpayers cannot meet this ownership 
and occupancy requirement, however, they can still receive partial gain 
exclusion if they can show that the reason for the sale is due to a “change in 
place of employment, health, or . . . [such other] unforeseen circumstances.”176 
Based on this statutory language alone, taxpayers may have difficulty 
determining whether their reason for selling their home qualifies as any of the 
prescribed circumstances. 
IRS Simplification. To assist taxpayers in making the determination of 
whether their sale is due to a “change in place of employment, health, or . . . 
[such other] unforeseen circumstances,” the IRS points to important factors 
that can help taxpayers make the determination.177 In IRS Publication 523 
(Selling Your Home), for example, the IRS states that a sale may meet the 
statutory standard if the taxpayer faced “significant financial difficulty 
 
 172 See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(d) (2016) (requirement to capitalize improvements). 
 173 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 523, SELLING YOUR HOME 5 (2015). 
 174 I.R.C. §§ 121(a), (b) (2012).  
 175 I.R.C. § 121(a). 
 176 I.R.C. § 121(c)(2)(B). 
 177 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 173, at 4–5. 
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maintaining the home.”178 As another important factor, the IRS describes that 
the sale may meet the statutory standard if the home “became significantly less 
suitable as a main home for [the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s] family for a 
specific reason.”179 The IRS’s repeated use of the term “significant” in 
describing the important factors provides taxpayers with a mental shortcut for 
determining whether their reasons for selling their home meet the statutory 
standard of a sale due to a “change in place of employment, health, or . . . 
[such other] unforeseen circumstances.”180 
Tax Law. In creating this mental shortcut, however, the IRS has made a 
subtle, but potentially noteworthy, change to the relevant tax law. While IRS 
Publication 523 refers to “significant financial difficulty” and a “significantly 
less suitable” main home, the applicable Treasury regulations instead use the 
term “material” to describe these events.181 For instance, in the Treasury 
regulations that form the basis of the IRS’s statements in IRS Publication 523, 
the Treasury provides that a taxpayer may claim the partial gain exclusion if 
the “taxpayer’s financial ability to maintain the property is materially 
impaired.”182 Likewise, these regulations offer taxpayers the ability to claim 
the exclusion if the “suitability of the property as the taxpayer’s principal 
residence materially changes.”183 By substituting the word “significantly” in 
the taxpayer publication for the word “materially,” the IRS has added its own 
gloss to factors that otherwise appear almost verbatim in the Treasury 
regulations. 
Taxpayer Effects. The IRS’s substitution of the word “significantly” for the 
word “materially” could have different effects on taxpayers’ decisions. 
Whether the substitution causes taxpayers to be more likely to forego or claim 
the principal residence gain exclusion likely depends on the taxpayer’s 
sophistication with the tax law and whether the taxpayer is relying on a tax 
advisor. 
For some taxpayers, especially those who do not have a sophisticated legal 
background, the change of terms may discourage them from claiming the 
principal residence gain exclusion. For example, a basic dictionary definition 
 
 178 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 179 Id. (emphasis added). 
 180 I.R.C. § 121(c)(2)(B). 
 181 Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(b) (2016). 
 182 Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 183 Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
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of “material” includes terms such as “relevant,”184 while the definition of 
“significant” includes terms such as “momentous.”185 It is possible that a 
taxpayer may perceive that a higher standard must be met in order to claim the 
principal residence gain exclusion than if the IRS had adopted the Treasury 
regulations’ “materially” language. The IRS publication may discourage such a 
taxpayer from claiming exclusions that the taxpayer may have taken based on 
the regulations. 
On the other hand, taxpayers with a sophisticated legal background (or who 
have tax advisors) could conclude that the word “significantly” in the taxpayer 
publication creates a lower standard than the word “materially.” When 
addressing corporations’ internal financial reporting controls, the U.S. 
Securities & Exchange Commission has defined “significant deficiencies” as 
lesser problems than “material weaknesses.”186 Similarly, in merger 
agreements, parties can exit signed deals if they discover a material, as 
opposed to a significant, adverse change, signifying again that, for corporate 
law purposes, material is a higher standard than significant.187 Using this 
knowledge, taxpayers with a sophisticated legal background (or their advisors) 
may assume a lower standard is required by the taxpayer publication, relative 
to the standard set forth in regulations. 
As this example illustrates, by substituting its own administrative gloss for 
the text in the applicable statute or regulations, the IRS may influence 
taxpayers’ views of the law in ways that may not be consistent with the actual 
tax law. Whether this causes taxpayers to be more or less likely to claim a tax 
benefit, the outcome may be different from that which Congress or the 
Treasury intended. 
c. Multiple Individual Retirement Account Rollovers 
When adding administrative gloss to the tax law in taxpayer publications, 
the IRS can also make changes that unambiguously benefit taxpayers, as 
revealed by a publication regarding individual retirement account (IRA) 
rollovers. Under current law, holders of IRAs, which are tax-favored savings 
 
 184 Material, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/material 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
 185 Significant, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2014). 
 186 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2016); Definition of the Term Significant Deficiency, Release No. 33-8829, 72 
Fed. Reg. 44924 (Aug. 9, 2007). 
 187 See Andrew A. Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and the Material 
Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 829–30 (2010). 
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accounts, can withdraw amounts from these accounts before reaching age 
59 1/2 without triggering tax liability and a 10% early withdrawal tax penalty 
as long as the taxpayer deposits the withdrawn amounts directly into another 
IRA within sixty days (an “IRA rollover”).188 While the statute clearly states 
that a taxpayer may complete this rollover process only once each year with 
respect to a particular IRA, it does not address whether a taxpayer who holds 
more than one IRA may complete multiple tax-free rollovers using multiple 
IRAs each year.189 
IRS Simplification. Starting in 1984, the IRS addressed this ambiguity by 
adding its own administrative gloss to the statutory language.190 For thirty 
years in IRS Publication 590 (Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs)), 
the IRS stated that multiple IRA rollovers in a single tax year were permissible 
without resulting in tax or an early withdrawal tax penalty, even though this 
language did not appear in the statute itself.191 In stating this rule, the IRS 
parroted language from a proposed, but never finalized, Treasury regulation 
issued in 1981.192 
Tax Law. The Tax Court ultimately disagreed with the rule the IRS had set 
forth in Publication 590. In Bobrow v. Commissioner,193 a prominent New 
York City tax lawyer, Alvan Bobrow, applied the tax treatment suggested by 
the IRS in IRS Publication 590.194 Bobrow and his wife made multiple IRA 
rollovers in 2008.195 Following the IRS’s description of the tax law at the time, 
the taxpayers treated these transactions as tax-free rollovers.196 The Tax Court 
rejected the taxpayers’ tax treatment, ruling that the “plain language” of the 
relevant statute only permits taxpayers to participate in a single tax-free IRA 
rollover each year.197 
Following Bobrow, the IRS revised the taxpayer publication to match the 
Tax Court’s interpretation.198 However, the IRS also announced that it would 
 
 188 I.R.C. § 408(d)(3) (2012). 
 189 I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(B). 
 190 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 590, INDIVIDUAL 
RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS (IRAS) 25–26 (2014).  
 191 Id. at 25. 
 192 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-4(b)(4)(ii), 46 Fed. Reg. 36,206 (July 14, 1981). 
 193 No. 7022-11, T.C.M. 2014-21 (2014). 
 194 Id. at 3–5. 
 195 Id. at 4–5. 
 196 Id. at 5. 
 197 Id. at 12–13. 
 198 I.R.S. Announcement 2014-15, 2014-16 I.R.B. 973, 973.  
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“not apply the Bobrow interpretation . . . to any rollover that involves an IRA 
distribution occurring before January 1, 2015.”199 Consequently, the IRS will 
not challenge taxpayers who participated in multiple IRA rollovers in a single 
tax year prior to Publication 590’s revision in 2015.200 
Taxpayer Effects. This example demonstrates how, at times, the IRS’s 
administrative gloss in taxpayer publications may be taxpayer favorable. 
Without question, the administrative gloss in IRS Publication 590 was 
advantageous to taxpayers, relative to the reading of the statute ultimately 
adopted by the Bobrow court. Moreover, as Bobrow exemplifies, taxpayer-
favorable administrative gloss in IRS publications can even influence the tax 
planning and reporting decisions of sophisticated taxpayers, such as corporate 
tax lawyers.201 This example also shows that when the IRS issues a taxpayer-
favorable proposed Treasury regulation, it may restate this regulation in an IRS 
publication.202 For most individuals, the restatement appears as though it is 
current law, because the IRS publication provides no indication that its source 
is merely a proposed Treasury regulation.203 
3. Failing to Fully Explain the Tax Law 
A final category of simplexity consists of descriptions of the tax law in IRS 
publications that omit discussion of relevant exceptions or that otherwise fail to 
fully explain the tax law. Several examples of these types of statements are 
described below. 
a. Bartering Deductions 
One example of an IRS description that fails to fully explain the tax law 
can be found in the context of bartering transactions. A bartering transaction 
involves paying for a good or service with another good or service. For 
instance, if a dentist requires the services of an electrician in order to maintain 
equipment in her office, she may pay for the electrician’s services by providing 
 
 199 Id. at 974. 
 200 Id.; see also IRA One-Rollover-Per-Year Rule, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/ 
Retirement-Plans/IRA-One-Rollover-Per-Year-Rule (last updated Jan. 22, 2016). 
 201 Bobrow, T.C.M. 2014-21, at 3 (explaining the taxpayer is “an attorney specializing in tax law”). 
 202 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 190, at 25–26; see also Janet Novack, Gotcha! Tax Court 
Penalizes IRA Rollover that IRS Publication Says Is Allowed, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2014/03/25/gotcha-tax-court-penalizes-ira-rollover-that-irs-publication-says-is-
allowed/#1b2deefc22a3 (noting restatement of text in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-4(b)(4)(ii) in IRS 
Publication 590 prior to 2014). 
 203 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 190, at 25–26. 
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$1000 worth of dental services (a molar root canal) to the electrician. 
Taxpayers engaged in bartering transactions such as these face two tax 
questions: (1) Must they include in income the goods or services that they have 
received; and (2) may they deduct from income the goods or services that they 
have provided? 
IRS Simplification. The IRS addresses bartering exchanges in several 
taxpayer publications.204 Regarding the first question, inclusion in income, in 
IRS Publication 525 (Taxable and Nontaxable Income), the IRS states that 
taxpayers who receive property or services in a barter exchange “must include 
in [their] income, at the time received, the fair market value of property or 
services . . . receive[d] in bartering.”205 In other words, this statement clearly 
says that property or services received must be included in income. Regarding 
the second question, deductibility, the IRS provides an equally clear statement 
of the tax law. Specifically, in IRS Publication 535, the IRS states: 
Payments in kind. If you provide services to pay a business expense, 
the amount you can deduct is limited to your out-of-pocket costs. You 
cannot deduct the cost of your own labor.206 
This statement unambiguously informs taxpayers that they may not claim any 
tax deduction for the fair market value of their own labor in a barter exchange. 
Applying this description of the tax law to the earlier example, the dentist 
would have to include in income the $1000 of electrical services received, but 
would not be entitled to claim an ordinary and necessary business expense for 
the $1000 worth of dental services she provides, since the dental services she 
provides would be the “cost of [her] own labor.” 
Tax Law. The IRS’s statement regarding a taxpayer’s obligation to include 
in income the fair market value of services received in a barter exchange is 
correct. Taxpayers are required to include in income not only cash received, 
but also “services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other property.”207 For 
this reason, the dentist who receives electrical services clearly must include the 
$1000 of electrical services received in income. 
The IRS’s statement regarding a taxpayer’s inability to deduct the cost of 
her own labor would be correct if the taxpayer did not include the value of 
 
 204 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 525, TAXABLE AND NONTAXABLE 
INCOME 20 (2015) [hereinafter PUBLICATION 525]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 4. 
 205 PUBLICATION 525, supra note 204, at 20. 
 206 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 4 (emphasis added). 
 207 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (2016). 
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services received in income. For instance, imagine that the dentist and 
electrician exchanged labor of equal value. The dentist also had to purchase 
some materials to provide the electrician with the molar root canal. Imagine 
further that, despite the clear tax law regarding including the electrical services 
in income, the dentist fails to include in income the electrical services received. 
In this case, the dentist’s deduction should be limited to her out-of-pocket 
material costs, which, when added onto the value of the services she provided, 
exceeded the value of the electrical services received. Put differently, if the 
dentist ignored the inclusion of labor income, she should have to ignore the 
deduction of labor costs as well. 
However, when discussing the deduction question, the IRS fails to explain 
that as long as (1) the dentist includes in gross income the $1000 fair market 
value of the electrical services that she receives, and (2) the electrical services 
are ordinary and necessary expenses for her trade or business as a dentist, she 
should be able to deduct $1000 for the fair market value of the dental services 
she provides to the electrician (on top of any out-of pocket costs). To illustrate 
the reasoning underlying this result, if the electrician and the dentist had each 
performed their respective services for one another and also exchanged checks 
for $1000, the dentist would be required to include the $1000 received from 
the electrician and would be entitled to an ordinary and necessary business 
expense deduction for the $1000 provided to the electrician even though the 
exchange of checks of equivalent amounts would have been meaningless. 
Both judicial decisions and internal IRS memoranda support the deduction 
for the value of bartered services when the taxpayer includes the fair market 
value of services received. When addressing barter exchanges in Taxpayer 
Advice Memoranda, upon the request of an IRS director or area director, the 
IRS Office of Chief Counsel has stated that “[w]hen a taxpayer engages in a 
barter transaction, the transaction should be treated as if the taxpayer sold its 
own product or services at fair market value and then paid fair market value for 
the product or services of the other party.”208 In support of this rule, the 
memorandum cites several judicial decisions, including United States v. 
General Shoe Corp.209 and Estate of Wood v. Commissioner.210 Applying this 
treatment to the example at hand, the dentist should be treated as selling her 
dental services to the electrician, resulting in an inclusion in income of $1000, 
 
 208 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200147032 (Nov. 23, 2001). 
 209 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960). 
 210 39 T.C. 1 (1962). 
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and then using the proceeds of this hypothetical sale to purchase the 
electrician’s electrical services, resulting in an ordinary and necessary business 
expense deduction of $1000. 
Taxpayer Effects. The IRS’s presentation of the tax law regarding bartering 
exchanges nonetheless suggests to taxpayers that they are not entitled to 
ordinary and necessary business expense deductions for the value of their 
services provided. Many tax advice websites, popular press stories, and other 
taxpayer resources simply restate the IRS’s unqualified statement from 
Publication 535 that taxpayers are not entitled to deduct the value of their own 
labor.211 By failing to more fully address the deductibility question in 
conjunction with an inclusion in income, as the IRS has done in internal 
memoranda,212 the IRS publications present a potentially misleading 
description of the tax law. While this omission has not received substantial 
public attention, some accountants have noted that the IRS’s description of 
bartering transactions reveals that the IRS will “fully disclose . . . when to 
report income,” but will leave it “up to [taxpayers] . . . to discover [their] 
deductions.”213 Moreover, the importance of this IRS simplification, if 
unchanged, is only likely to grow as more taxpayers turn to barter websites, 
such as TaskRabbit,214 Tradeaway,215 and other social media services to use 
bartering in order pay for business expenses.216 
b. Early Individual Retirement Account Distributions 
Another example of an IRS description that does not fully explain the tax 
law can be found in the IRS publication regarding early distributions from 
IRAs.217 As discussed earlier, if taxpayers under age 59 1/2 withdraw funds 
from an IRA, such as a § 401(k) plan, they must pay tax on the withdrawn 
amount plus a 10% early withdrawal tax penalty, unless certain exceptions 
 
 211 See infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 212 I.R.S. Gen. Counsel Mem. 200411042 (Feb. 6, 2004); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200147032 (Nov. 23, 
2001). 
 213 William Brighenti, Tax Deductions of Barter Exchanges: Barterer Beware of IRS’s Posture on Barter 
Tax Deductions, ACCOUNTANTS CPA HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, LLC, http://www.cpa-connecticut.com/ 
barter-tax-deductions.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
 214 TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
 215 TRADEAWAY, http://www.tradeaway.com/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (“The World’s Largest Barter 
Site! Where CASH is NOT always King!”). 
 216 For further discussion, see Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 989 (2016). 
 217 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 590-B, DISTRIBUTIONS FROM 
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS (IRAS) 24–25 (2015). 
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apply.218 One such exception is that the taxpayer receives distributions from an 
IRA in the form of an annuity. Specifically, current law provides that the 10% 
early withdrawal tax penalty does not apply to “part of a series of substantially 
equal periodic payments (not less frequently than annually) made for the life 
(or life expectancy) of the employee or the joint lives (or joint life 
expectancies) of such employee and his designated beneficiary.”219 Taxpayers 
who desire to withdraw funds from an IRA using an annuity arrangement, 
therefore, must determine whether they will satisfy the distribution 
requirements for such an annuity. 
IRS Simplification. In providing guidance to taxpayers regarding this issue, 
the IRS states in IRS Publication 590-B: 
You can receive distributions from your traditional IRA that are part 
of a series of substantially equal payments over your life (or your life 
expectancy), or over the lives (or the joint life expectancies) of you 
and your beneficiary, without having to pay the 10% additional tax, 
even if you receive such distributions before you are age 59 1/2. You 
must use an IRS-approved distribution method and you must take at 
least one distribution annually for this exception to apply.220 
The IRS then goes on to describe three distribution methods, which the IRS 
previously approved as distribution methods in IRS Notice 89-25.221 Moreover, 
the taxpayer publication clearly implies that these are the only IRS-approved 
distribution methods. The publication does so by describing one of the three 
methods, and then explaining that there are “two other IRS-approved 
distribution methods that you can use,” followed by a short discussion of 
them.222 By negative implication, there would appear to be no other IRS-
approved distribution methods. As a result, the publication clearly implies to 
taxpayers that, in order to meet the statutory annuity exception, they must use 
one of these three distribution methods. 
Tax Law. While the IRS publication references three distribution methods 
that it has pre-approved and implies that taxpayers must use one of these to 
meet the statutory annuity exception, in reality, the IRS has allowed taxpayers 
to use additional distribution methods. In several private letter rulings, the IRS 
 
 218 I.R.C. §§ 72(t)(1), 408(d)(1) (2012). 
 219 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(iv). 
 220 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 217, at 25 (emphasis added). 
 221 Id.  
 222 Id.  
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has approved alternative distribution methods proposed by taxpayers.223 
Further, in more technical guidance than IRS publications, the IRS has 
conceded that taxpayers may use distribution methods other than these three 
methods. In this technical guidance, the IRS states that the three methods of 
distribution “do not represent the only distribution methods which will satisfy 
the requirements of section 72(t)(2)(A)(iv) of the Code.”224 This concession, of 
course, is in direct contravention of IRS Publication 590-B. 
Taxpayer Effects. This example illustrates how the IRS may create safe 
harbors in administrative guidance and then later, in taxpayer publications, 
imply—or explicitly state—that these safe harbors represent the only possible 
methods for complying with the tax law. By omitting discussion of other 
distribution possibilities and including the words “you must,”225 the IRS 
dramatically limits the potential distribution options that most taxpayers will 
consider. Many taxpayers will only participate in annuity distributions that use 
one of the “IRS-approved” distribution methods. Others may choose not to 
participate in annuity arrangements if they do not comply with one of the IRS-
approved methods. And some taxpayers who participate in IRA annuities that 
do not match one of the IRS-approved distribution methods may pay the 10% 
early withdrawal tax penalty, even though they are not necessarily required to 
do so under the tax law.226 
c. Characterization of Activity as Profit-Seeking 
A final example of an IRS simplification that does not fully explain the tax 
law is the IRS’s description of factors that determine whether an activity 
represents a profit-seeking activity.227 Taxpayers are entitled to claim 
deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses of their profit-seeking 
activities.228 However, if taxpayers pursue activities that are “not engaged in 
for profit,” such as hobbies and other recreational pursuits, they may only 
deduct expenses to the extent of any income actually generated by these 
activities.229 A key question a taxpayer faces when determining whether to 
claim ordinary and necessary expenses, consequently, is whether the 
 
 223 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201030038 (May 5, 2010); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200943044 (Jul. 28, 
2009); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9008073 (Nov. 30, 1989). 
 224 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9008073 (Nov. 30, 1989). 
 225 E.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 217, at 25. 
 226 I.R.C. § 72(t) (2012). 
 227 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 5. 
 228 I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012). 
 229 I.R.C. § 183(a) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (2016). 
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taxpayer’s activity constitutes a profit-seeking activity, or, alternatively, an 
activity “not engaged in for profit.”230 
IRS Simplification. The IRS advises taxpayers that a variety of factors 
affect whether an activity should be classified as profit seeking. In IRS 
Publication 535 (Business Expenses), the IRS includes a list of relevant factors 
that taxpayers should consider, such as whether: “[y]ou carry on the activity in 
a businesslike manner”; “[y]ou depend on the income for your livelihood”; 
“[y]our losses are due to circumstances beyond your control (or are normal in 
the start-up phase of your type of business)”; “[y]ou change your methods of 
operation in an attempt to improve profitability”; and “[y]ou were successful in 
making a profit in similar activities in the past.”231 
Tax Law. Several of the factors in the IRS’s taxpayer publication differ 
from those listed in the applicable Treasury regulations. For example, the IRS 
lists as a factor in IRS Publication 535 whether “[y]ou depend on the income 
for your livelihood.”232 The Treasury regulations’ discussion of this factor is 
more nuanced. The Treasury regulations label this factor as “[t]he financial 
status of the taxpayer,” and describe, for instance, that: 
Substantial income from sources other than the activity (particularly 
if the losses from the activity generate substantial tax benefits) may 
indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit especially if there 
are personal or recreational elements involved.233 
Compared to this more nuanced approach, the taxpayer publication’s simpler 
summary is a much starker inquiry. 
Taxpayer Effects. By not fully explaining the factors in the Treasury 
regulations, the IRS may cause some taxpayers to conclude that an activity 
represents a hobby, while the Treasury regulations may provide the taxpayer 
with greater latitude to characterize it as a business. 
For instance, imagine that a stay-at home father has recently started a class 
for children at the local town center. The class will guide children in how to 
launch their own, self-designed initiatives (such as recycling programs or even 
money-making businesses). While parents will pay for their children to attend 
the class, this activity still results in various expenses, which the father will pay 
 
 230 I.R.C. § 183(c) (2012). 
 231 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 5. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(8) (2016).  
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for out of pocket. On a net basis, the father hopes he will make a little profit 
from the class, but, regardless, almost all of his family’s income will still come 
from his wife’s job. 
If the father looks solely to IRS Publication 535 to determine whether his 
expenses from running this class are deductible, he may conclude they are not. 
He does not “depend” on the income from the class for his “livelihood.”234 He 
expects to make only a small amount from the class, and his wife’s salary will 
continue to provide for his family’s needs. However, if the father applied the 
more nuanced inquiry from the Treasury regulations, he may reach a different 
conclusion. While he does have substantial sources of income from other 
activity (his wife’s job), the expenses from the activity are not generating 
substantial tax benefits.235 There is also a strong argument that the class does 
not have substantial personal or recreational elements involved.236 Many 
people provide classes (such as tutoring or music lessons) to local children as a 
source of additional income, rather than as a form of personal recreation. 
Applying the Treasury regulation’s fuller explanation, therefore, the father may 
be more likely to conclude that running the class is a profit-seeking activity, 
yielding more beneficial tax treatment for his expenses. In terms of aggregate 
impact, especially in light of the vast number of activities that taxpayers could 
potentially claim to be “engaged in for profit,” IRS descriptions that cause 
taxpayers to conclude their activities are hobbies can yield substantial revenue 
savings for the government and reduced tax enforcement and litigation costs 
for the IRS. 
C. Taxpayer Exposure to Simplexity 
Individuals regularly encounter the types of simplexity described above 
when making decisions regarding whether and how to comply with the tax law. 
According to the IRS, approximately 56% of individuals retain the assistance 
of third-party advisors to prepare their tax returns and 34% of individuals use 
tax preparation software.237 The remaining 10% of individuals prepare their 
annual tax returns without assistance.238 As this subpart demonstrates, both 
 
 234 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 5. 
 235 Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(8).  
 236 Id. 
 237 Protecting Taxpayers from Incompetent and Unethical Return Preparers: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of John A. Koskinen, Comm’r of Internal Revenue Service), 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koskinen%20Testimony.pdf. 
 238 Id. 
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individuals who prepare their annual tax returns without assistance and those 
who rely on third-party advisors or other sources for assistance are exposed to 
simplexity in IRS publications. 
Taxpayers who prepare their own individual income tax returns rely 
extensively on IRS publications, and IRS simplifications embedded within 
them. Individuals who do not wish to pay an accountant or purchase software 
often rely on IRS publications “to assist [them] in meeting their tax 
obligations.”239 For example, the instructions that accompany most IRS forms, 
such as IRS Form 1040, frequently refer taxpayers to IRS publications that 
address the content of the forms using plain language.240 Further, in 2014, 83% 
of taxpayers reported that IRS publications were “very or somewhat valuable” 
as a source of tax advice or information.241 Indeed, taxpayers vocally criticized 
the IRS’s 2015 announcement that, as a result of budget cuts, the agency would 
no longer deliver printed copies of IRS publications to public libraries.242 
Likewise, taxpayers who rely on other individuals or services to prepare 
their tax returns are also affected by the IRS simplifications. These taxpayers 
consult sources such as commercial tax preparation software, tax accountants 
and tax return preparers, secondary source publications, and the IRS itself. As 
the following examples illustrate, taxpayers who receive advice from these 
sources are often indirectly exposed to the simplexity of IRS publications. 
Tax Preparation Software. Each year, over forty million U.S. taxpayers use 
commercial tax preparation software, such as Intuit’s TurboTax, to complete 
and file their tax returns.243 In addition to noting that “IRS publications can 
help fill in the gaps and ease your frustrations when preparing your tax 
return,”244 TurboTax provides users with access to more than 700 tax 
 
 239 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2011-40-070, THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE PROVIDES HELPFUL AND ACCURATE TAX LAW ASSISTANCE, BUT TAXPAYERS EXPERIENCE LENGTHY 
WAIT TIMES TO SPEAK WITH ASSISTORS 21 (2011). 
 240 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CATALOG NO. 24811V, 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 18 
(2015) (“For details, see Pub. 501.”). 
 241 IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2014 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 15 (2014). 
 242 See Tax Forms Outlet Program (TFOP), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/tax-
forms-outlet-program-tfop (last updated Oct. 3, 2015). While taxpayers may still print copies of the IRS 
publications themselves at public libraries for a per-page fee, some critics responded that the change in policy 
will result in an “unfair burden” and “inconvenien[ce].” James Niedzinski, IRS Cuts Back on Distribution of 
Tax Forms, EAGLE-TRIBUNE (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.eagletribune.com/news/new_hampshire/irs-cuts-
back-on-distribution-of-tax-forms/article_a13fc21f-68d8-5507-9653-5c544fec3eea.html. 
 243 See Protecting Taxpayers, supra note 237. 
 244 Video: What Are IRS Publications?, INTUIT TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tools/tax-
tips/IRS-Tax-Forms/Video—What-Are-IRS-Publications-/INF14668.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
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professionals who frequently restate the IRS simplifications through online and 
telephone advice.245 For instance, just as the IRS notes that refinancing points 
related to a home mortgage must be amortized without acknowledging 
contradictory case law,246 TurboTax advisors inform users that “you can 
deduct the points you pay to get the new loan over the life of the loan.”247 As 
another example, TurboTax advisors repeat the IRS’s administrative gloss that 
an ordinary and necessary business expense is one that is “common and 
accepted” in the taxpayer’s industry, despite the lack of uniform judicial 
treatment of this issue.248 TurboTax states that users’ expenses “must be what 
the IRS calls ‘ordinary and necessary.’ This means the item or service is 
common and accepted in your line of work and is appropriate and helpful to 
your job.” 249 The reference to the IRS leaves little doubt that, in crafting this 
description of the test for the deductibility of business expenses, TurboTax 
advisors have drawn directly on IRS Publication 535, discussed earlier.250 As 
these examples reveal, taxpayers who use TurboTax often receive advice that 
reiterates IRS simplifications. 
The fact that commercial tax preparation software, like TurboTax, often 
reiterates IRS simplifications is not surprising. The firms that sell such 
software have incentives to encourage their customers to adopt the IRS’s 
approach. Intuit, for instance, provides purchasers of TurboTax with an 
“[a]udit [s]upport [g]uarantee.”251 The TurboTax user agreement provides that 
if the user is subject to an IRS audit, Intuit will provide free audit guidance 
from a trained tax professional, who will answer all audit-related questions.252 
If the user is not satisfied with this audit support guidance, Intuit will refund 
the user’s purchase price paid for the TurboTax software.253 As a result of this 
guarantee, increased IRS audits of TurboTax users pose a threat to Intuit’s 
 
 245 See Margaret Collins, TurboTax Offers Live Tax Advice to Lure Clients from H&R Block, BLOOMBERG 
TECH. (Feb. 14, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-14/turbotax-army-of-
tax-guides-offers-free-aid-to-lure-clients-from-h-r-block.  
 246 See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text. 
 247 Deducting Mortgage Interest FAQs, INTUIT TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tools/tax-
tips/Home-Ownership/Deducting-Mortgage-Interest-FAQs/INF12051.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) 
(emphasis added). 
 248 See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text. 
 249 Jeremy Vohwinkle, What Are Job-Related Tax Deductions?, INTUIT TURBOTAX (Apr. 9, 2012), 
http://blog.turbotax.intuit.com/tax-deductions-and-credits-2/what-are-job-related-tax-deductions-9307/. 
 250 See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
 251 Audit Support Guarantee, INTUIT TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/corp/guarantees.jsp (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
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bottom line. Since taxpayers who adopt the IRS’s approach likely face a lower 
risk of IRS audit, Intuit has a strong economic motivation to encourage its 
users to adopt these positions, even when they are less taxpayer-favorable than 
the underlying tax law. 
Tax Accountants and Return Preparers. While certified public accountants 
and other tax return preparers are more knowledgeable than individuals with 
no tax expertise, they are nonetheless also affected by the simplexity in IRS 
publications. For example, while some accountants have questioned254 the 
IRS’s statement in IRS Publication 535 that taxpayers “cannot deduct the cost 
of [their] own labor”255 in bartering exchanges, many have repeated this 
statement in their advice to current and prospective clients. Some rephrase the 
IRS simplification (e.g., “[t]he cost of your own labor is not a business 
expense—because you did not pay anyone for it”256). Others repeat the IRS’s 
own language that deductions are limited to out-of-pocket expenses rather than 
labor.257 As another illustration, some tax accountants reiterate the IRS’s 
statement in IRS Publication 523, described earlier,258 that taxpayers may only 
claim the principal residence gain exclusion if they have experienced a 
“significant financial difficulty.”259 These advisors’ use of the term 
“significant,” rather than the Treasury regulations’ use of “material,” confirms 
that they have parroted the language from the IRS publication in their advice to 
clients.260 And certified public accountants regularly define terms and explain 
issues by referring clients to specific IRS publications.261 Third-party tax 
advice, especially from accountants and tax return preparers, thus frequently 
reinforces the simplexity of IRS publications. 
 
 254 See, e.g., Brighenti, supra note 213. 
 255 Supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 256 Where Do I Deduct All My Business Expenses?, IRS HELP—MICHAEL PLAKS, EA (Mar. 23, 2016), 
http://www.michaelplaks.com/business-taxes/business-expenses. 
 257 See, e.g., Rachel Brenke, Tax Issues with Bartering Photography Services, THELAWTOG (Mar. 24, 
2015), http://www.thelawtog.com/tax-issues-with-bartering-photography-services/; Tips for Bartering, 
TAXACT, https://www.taxact.com/tax-information/tax-topics/tips-for-bartering.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
 258 See supra notes 173–80 and accompanying text. 
 259 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 173, at 5; see, e.g., WillMc1, Comment to Would My Work 
Situation Qualify for House Sale Tax Exemption?, H&R BLOCK: THE COMMUNITY (Aug. 16, 2015, 1:18 PM), 
http://community.hrblock.com/t5/All-Things-Tax/Would-my-work-situation-qualify-for-House-Sale-tax-
exemption/td-p/67789#.Vg3UQ_lVhHx. 
 260 See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
 261 See, e.g., Jason Blumeron, What Expenses Can I Deduct in My Business (Per the IRS)?, Part 1 of 3, 
BLUMER (Jun. 24, 2014), https://www.blumercpas.com/blog/what-expenses-can-i-deduct-in-my-business-per-
the-irs-part-1-of-3 (“These are define[d] in Publication 535 from the IRS.”). 
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Structural causes also explain why many accountants and tax return 
preparers rely on IRS publications. Accountants and tax return preparers 
receive professional training that relies heavily on IRS publications. The 
certification exam for certified public accountants frequently includes 
questions regarding specific IRS publications.262 Likewise, in creating a 
“return preparer competency exam” for individual tax return preparers, the IRS 
recently announced that it would allow individuals taking this exam to have 
“electronic access to IRS Publication 17, Your Federal Income Tax, during the 
proceedings.”263 And every IRS-enrolled agent, the highest credential awarded 
by the IRS, must demonstrate extensive knowledge of IRS publications. 
Individuals who seek this special status must pass a three-part comprehensive 
exam prepared by the IRS.264 The IRS advises individuals taking this 
examination to review several IRS publications, including IRS Publication 17 
(Your Federal Income Tax) and IRS Publication 535 (Business Expenses), 
among several others.265 As a result of their training and certification 
requirements, accountants and tax return preparers regularly consult IRS 
publications as a source of the tax law. 
Secondary Sources. Taxpayers are also indirectly exposed to the IRS’s 
statements in IRS publications through secondary source tax advice 
publications. For example, J.K. Lasser’s Your Income Taxes, one of the best-
selling annual tax return preparation publications, contains dozens of 
references to specific IRS publications in support of the guidance described.266 
Other popular tax return preparation publications contain direct references to 
the IRS simplifications (e.g., “According to IRS Publication 535 . . . , a 
business expense must be . . . .”).267 And even the secondary resources that tax 
accountants and lawyers use restate IRS simplifications as though they are law. 
As an example, Bloomberg BNA’s Tax Management Portfolios, which are 
often consulted by tax professionals, contain statements such as “given the IRS 
 
 262 See, e.g., CPA CPE Tax Courses, PLATINUM PROF. SERVS., https://www.platinumcourses.com/course/ 
category.php?id=1 (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (“Using actual IRS Publications, a series of 145 questions will 
guide you through each tax subject . . . .”). 
 263 Michael Beller, IRS Will Hold Off on Preparer Fingerprinting Requirements, 133 TAX NOTES 808, 
809 (Nov. 14, 2011). 
 264 Enrolled Agent Information, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/ 
enrolled-agents/enrolled-agent-information (last updated Apr. 22, 2016). 
 265 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 1470, PACKAGE FOR THE SPECIAL 
ENROLLMENT EXAMINATION 7 (1993). 
 266 J.K. LASSER’S YOUR INCOME TAX 2014 (Prof’l ed. 2013). 
 267 MARTHA MAEDA, HOW TO OPEN & OPERATE A FINANCIALLY SUCCESSFUL INDEPENDENT RECORD 
LABEL 84 (2012). 
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position announced in IRS Pub. 936, caution is warranted in deducting 
capitalized points where the same lender provides the new financing.”268 The 
simplexity that originates in IRS publications thus spreads to individuals 
through influential secondary source publications. 
IRS Taxpayer Assistance. Finally, IRS representatives who directly assist 
individuals in preparing their annual tax returns reiterate descriptions from IRS 
publications. IRS representatives who assist taxpayers at taxpayer assistance 
centers and over the IRS help line receive special training in the “publication 
method.”269 When individuals approach these representatives with a question 
about their tax returns, the publication method requires the representatives to 
“obtain the appropriate publication, discuss specific information related to the 
topic, ask appropriate questions to obtain facts, and respond to the taxpayer’s 
issue or question.”270 When addressing individual taxpayers’ requests, these 
representatives quote from or refer individuals to IRS publications that contain 
IRS simplifications.271 Further, in the past, if so requested by taxpayers, IRS 
representatives at taxpayer assistance centers would complete qualified 
individual taxpayers’ returns for them.272 When completing such returns, the 
IRS required its taxpayer assistance representatives to use existing IRS 
publications when determining taxpayers’ eligibility for various deductions 
and credits.273 
As this discussion illustrates, individual taxpayers are continually exposed 
to the simplexity in IRS publications, whether they prepare their tax returns 
directly, utilize tax return preparation software, or seek assistance from 
accountants and professional tax return preparers. This pervasive exposure 
means that the IRS has significant power to shape taxpayers’ views of the tax 
law through IRS publications. Whether and how the IRS should possess and 
exercise this power is an important question that the next Part will address. 
 
 268 Tax Implications of Home Ownership, TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) 594 (2013). 
 269 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2004-40-025, IMPROVEMENTS ARE 
NEEDED TO ENSURE TAX RETURNS ARE CORRECTLY PREPARED AT TAXPAYER ASSISTANCE CENTERS 11 
(2003). 
 270 Id. 
 271 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 239, at 21. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. Budget cuts have caused the IRS to suspend such programs temporarily. I.R.S. News Release IR-
2015-97 (July 15, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/IR-15-097.pdf. 
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III. IS SIMPLEXITY SOUND? 
Should the IRS use plain language to explain complex, often ambiguous 
tax law to the public? As this Part argues, while simplexity offers a number of 
potential tax administration and compliance benefits, it can also threaten vital 
values of democratic governance and fairness. Fundamentally, unearthing the 
concept of simplexity lays bare a trade-off between understandability and 
accurate representation of the law. While there is no simple way to resolve this 
trade-off, recognizing that it exists makes it possible to evaluate whether 
simplexity is too high or too low in a given situation. After highlighting the 
trade-off at stake, this Part considers several strategies for making simplexity 
more apparent (thereby making it easier to evaluate it in a given case), which 
can also help maximize the benefits of simplexity while minimizing its 
drawbacks. This Part then concludes by predicting the likely emergence of 
simplexity in several oft-discussed future tax compliance initiatives: 
government-prepared tax returns, interactive tax return filing, and increased 
third-party reporting. 
A. Benefits 
Simplexity offers a number of potential tax compliance and administration 
benefits: it enables the IRS to summarize complex tax law in understandable 
terms for many taxpayers, reveals the IRS’s likely litigating positions to the 
public, and supports the government’s efforts to raise tax revenue. 
1. Tax Law in Plain Language 
Where they describe the tax law accurately, IRS simplifications can help 
taxpayers understand the tax law as it exists in the Internal Revenue Code, 
Treasury regulations, case law, and other authorities. For example, if an 
individual receives a cash dividend from a public corporation, the individual 
will need to determine whether he has held the stock long enough to receive a 
preferential tax rate on “qualified dividend income.”274 A review of the 
Internal Revenue Code will cause him to read multiple provisions in search of 
the answer and to insert figures from one statutory provision into the text of 
another provision.275 In IRS Publication 17 (Your Federal Income Tax), 
however, the taxpayer will read a clear distillation of the law, which states 
simply that he must have “held the stock for more than 60 days during the 121-
 
 274 I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2012). 
 275 I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B)(iii) (2012) (directing taxpayers to I.R.C. § 246(c)). 
BLANK_OSOFSKY GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/10/2017 10:59 AM 
2017] SIMPLEXITY 235 
day period that begins 60 days before the ex-dividend date.”276 This shortcut 
can enable the taxpayer to complete his tax return more efficiently than if he 
consulted the Internal Revenue Code directly, assuming he could even access 
the text. Further, this IRS simplification can streamline the inquiry for third 
parties who may be assisting taxpayers with their tax return filings, thereby 
reducing taxpayers’ costs of filing. 
2. Visibility into the IRS’s Views of the Tax Law 
IRS simplifications also reveal the IRS’s views of the tax law to taxpayers 
and their advisors. Despite their limited status as legal authority,277 IRS 
simplifications provide taxpayers with an advance view of how the IRS would 
likely respond to a specific tax position during audits or litigation. Especially 
in situations where the statutory text is ambiguous, such as the meaning of 
“ordinary” business expenses under § 162(a) of the Code,278 IRS 
simplifications provide insights about the IRS’s probable reactions before 
taxpayers file their tax returns. Taxpayers can respond to IRS simplifications 
by foregoing the tax position at issue, and the potentially resulting tax 
controversy, or conversely, by claiming the tax position and preparing to 
contest the IRS’s interpretation. 
IRS simplifications can mirror and help amplify the IRS’s duty to disclose 
information about the tax system in other contexts. Under § 6110 of the Code, 
the IRS is required to publicly disclose all “written determination[s],” such as 
private letter rulings, tax-exempt determination letters, and technical advice 
memoranda, among others.279 Congress enacted this provision to prevent the 
IRS from creating “secret law” in internal communications and in private letter 
rulings, which would only be accessible to “a few major tax practitioners” who 
frequently interacted with IRS officials.280 IRS simplifications can be seen as 
an extension of Congress’s desire to prevent the IRS from shielding its own 
 
 276 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 17, TAX GUIDE 2014, 65 (2015). 
 277 Taxpayers cannot rely on these statements as legal authority (though they may raise their reliance as a 
defense to certain tax penalties, see Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(a) (2014)). See Adler v. Comm’r, 330 F.2d 91, 93 
(9th Cir. 1964); Miller v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 184, 195 (2000); Zimmerman v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 367, 371 
(1978). For a recent discussion, see Cauble, supra note 41. But see Shapiro, supra note 41 (offering contrary 
arguments).  
 278 See supra notes 112–26 and accompanying text. 
 279 I.R.C. § 6110 (2012). 
 280 OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 1 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SCOPE AND USE OF 
TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 27 (2000); see also S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 305 (2d 
Sess. 1976). 
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legal interpretations from public view. While many forms of written 
determinations, such as Chief Counsel Advice memoranda, state the IRS’s 
view of the tax law in technical terms understandable to tax lawyers and 
experienced accountants,281 IRS simplifications present the IRS’s views to the 
public. 
IRS simplifications can also help ensure that the IRS’s own employees 
administer the law in accordance with high level, centralized views of it. As 
scholars have argued, agencies function more effectively “when central 
officials can advise responsible bureaucrats how they should apply agency 
law.”282 The IRS has nearly 90,000 employees283 and IRS publications explain 
the agency’s view of the tax law to many of its employees who must 
administer the tax law. Whether the employees provide taxpayer service 
through the IRS help line or review returns in field offices, the IRS regularly 
directs these employees to IRS publications rather than the Internal Revenue 
Code or Treasury regulations. 
3. Administration and Revenue Benefits 
Last, IRS simplifications can reduce the cost of tax administration and 
potentially result in increased tax revenue. As discussed previously, some IRS 
simplifications can cause taxpayers to forego certain tax benefits or to refrain 
from pursuing aggressive tax positions. For example, taxpayers who follow 
some of the IRS simplifications discussed earlier may alter their tax planning 
behavior by foregoing deductions for ordinary and necessary business 
expenses,284 amortizing mortgage refinancing points,285 capitalizing certain 
expenditures,286 declining to enter into leveraged leases,287 forfeiting the 
principal residence gain exclusion,288 paying the 10% IRA early withdrawal 
tax penalty,289 foregoing deductions on barter exchanges,290 and refraining 
 
 281 See About IRS Written Determinations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/About-
IRS-Written-Determinations (last updated Dec. 4, 2015). 
 282 Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an 
Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001). 
 283 See Jonathan H. Adler, How the IRS Has Changed Since 1974, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/02/how-the-irs-has-
changed-since-1974/?utm_term=.e68b3f0d395a (discussing former IRS Chief Counsel Don Korb’s speech). 
 284 See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 285 See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 286 See supra notes 165–72 and accompanying text. 
 287 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 288 See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text. 
 289 See supra notes 217–26 and accompanying text. 
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from claiming losses by characterizing an activity as a hobby rather than a 
business,291 among others. To the extent that these IRS simplifications and 
others encourage taxpayers to adopt the IRS’s interpretations of the tax law 
despite the existence of contrary legal authority, simplexity bolsters the IRS’s 
ability to raise revenue and reduces its need to expend resources contesting 
alternative taxpayer positions. 
In addition, some commentators have theorized that the IRS’s customer 
service efforts, including IRS simplifications, could generate feelings of 
reciprocity toward the IRS among individual taxpayers, resulting in increased 
voluntary compliance. Scholars such as Kathleen DeLaney Thomas have 
contended that by providing taxpayers with increased guidance and other 
“user-friendly” taxpayer services, the IRS may encourage taxpayers to report 
and pay their tax liability correctly.292 Further, government officials have 
reported that if the IRS fails to provide adequate taxpayer service, including in 
IRS publications and other sources, individual voluntary compliance will erode 
over time.293 These assertions suggest that the IRS’s use of plain language, an 
act of taxpayer service, could cause some individual taxpayers to reciprocate 
the IRS’s service by increasing their own tax compliance.294 
B. Threats 
Despite the potential tax administration benefits of simplexity, it can also 
promote opacity rather than transparency regarding the tax law and lead to 
inequitable benefits and burdens among different taxpayers who act on IRS 
simplifications in ways that, in each case, are unlikely to be policed effectively 
by administrative law. 
1. Reduced Tax Transparency 
In contrast to the objective of Sunstein and others of using plain language 
to increase open government,295 simplexity can diminish, rather than promote, 
tax transparency. Tax transparency can be defined broadly as the government’s 
 
 290 See supra notes 211–16 and accompanying text. 
 291 See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 292 Thomas, supra note 32. 
 293 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 36. 
 294 See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter 
Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 431 (2008). For a contrasting view, see Osofsky, supra note 38. 
 295 See supra notes 75–92. 
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openness to the public regarding its tax rules, agency interpretations, decision-
making processes, and enforcement practices.296 Simplexity can result in 
opacity rather than transparency of the tax law and tax administration in two 
ways. First, in terms of process, as a result of inadequate signaling of changes, 
explanations, and disclosure, the public cannot easily observe whether and why 
the IRS has used simplifying language to recast the tax law. Second, in terms 
of effect, ironically, simplexity may obscure individuals’ knowledge of the 
underlying tax law, as it exists in the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury 
regulations, and case law. 
Changes. When the IRS simplifies the tax law in IRS publications, it 
provides virtually no signal to the reader that it has made changes to the 
underlying tax law or that it has described its own view of the applicable tax 
law. For example, the IRS does not indicate in IRS Publication 525 that its 
explanation regarding bartering deductions directly contradicts applicable tax 
law or the IRS’s own internal memoranda on the topic.297 The absence of 
signals of changes to the underlying tax law in IRS publications differs starkly 
from government transparency in other areas. In both houses of Congress, bills 
that amend the law must provide a “comparative print,” which highlight how 
the bills strike out existing text and insert new text.298 As one legislative 
official has described the rationale for these rules, the “comparative print can 
be of great aid in ascertaining the intended effect of amendatory legislation.”299 
Similarly, when issuing final regulations, the Treasury explicitly describes 
changes made to “previously issued guidance,” including prior proposed 
regulations.300 Because these types of overt signals are not present in IRS 
publications, many readers cannot observe that the IRS has made changes to 
the tax law. 
Explanation. In addition to failing to highlight when it has used an IRS 
simplification to recharacterize the tax law, the IRS also fails to provide an 
 
 296 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14–15 (rev. ed. 1999); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of 
Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888–910 (2006); Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339; Jeremy Waldron, Accountability: Fundamental to Democracy 11 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. 
of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-13, 2014), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2410812. 
 297 See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text. 
 298 See RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HOW BILLS AMEND STATUTES (2003), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20617.pdf (describing House Rule XIII, cl. 3(e)(1) (the “Ramseyer Rule”) and 
Senate Rule XXVI, ¶ 12 (the “Cordon Rule”)). 
 299 Id. at 2. 
 300 See, e.g., T.D. 9655, 2014-9 I.R.B. 541, 541–42 (2014) (Shared Responsibility for Employers 
Regarding Health Coverage). 
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explanation for the IRS simplification to the reader. The lack of an explanation 
again differs from the government’s actions in other tax contexts. For instance, 
following the enactment of tax legislation, the Joint Committee on Taxation 
issues a report that describes present law, the newly enacted provision, and, 
importantly, the reasons for change to existing tax law.301 The IRS also 
provides significantly more explanation for its change in legal interpretations 
and new policies in other publicly disclosed documents. When announcing a 
new legal interpretation through the issuance of a Revenue Ruling, the IRS not 
only identifies the change, but also explains the rationale. For example, when 
adopting a new interpretation of the terms “married” and “marriage” in 
Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the IRS explained that its motivation for the change 
was to apply “the most natural reading” of the terms in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor.302 Similarly, when the IRS 
determines that it will not follow a particular judicial decision, it publicly 
announces its “nonacquiescence” and its rationale for this position in an Action 
on Decision.303 While most individuals have far more direct contact with IRS 
publications than with Revenue Rulings or Actions on Decision, IRS 
publications offer no comparable explanation for the IRS’s interpretations that 
differ from underlying tax law or judicial decisions. 
Disclaimer. Most IRS simplifications are unaccompanied by explicit 
disclaimers from the IRS. The IRS provides a statement on the cover of IRS 
Publication 17 (Your Federal Taxes) that “the information given [by the IRS] 
does not cover every situation and is not intended to replace the law or change 
its meaning.”304 However, this disclaimer is not sufficient to alert taxpayers to 
potential changes to the tax law in many cases. First, the disclaimer quoted 
above appears on the cover of IRS Publication 17, but does not appear in any 
of the other IRS publications. As illustrated in Part II, such publications 
contain numerous IRS simplifications.305 Instead, these other publications 
contain introductory language such as the following from IRS Publication 535 
(Business Expenses): “This publication discusses common business expenses 
 
 301 See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-2-13, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION 
ENACTED IN THE 112TH CONGRESS (2013). 
 302 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 (2013). 
 303 See, e.g., Actions Relating to Decisions of the Tax Court, 2013-32 I.R.B. (Aug. 5, 2013). 
 304 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 276, at 1. 
 305 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3 (no disclaimer); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 
130 (no disclaimer); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 173 (no disclaimer); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
supra note 190 (no disclaimer); PUBLICATION 525, supra note 204 (no disclaimer); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
supra note 217 (no disclaimer). 
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and explains what is and is not deductible.”306 Second, even though the IRS 
provides a disclaimer in one IRS publication, it still fails to signal to the reader 
that a specific statement deviates from the tax law or relevant case law. Indeed, 
even IRS Publication 17, which is 286 pages in length, contains only one 
disclaimer that is not associated with any specific text.307 By contrast, when the 
IRS issues an Action on Decision, it refers to the relevant judicial decision in 
order to focus the reader’s attention on the issue in controversy.308 
Additionally, when various secondary sources adopt IRS simplifications, they 
provide no disclaimer. As a result, the single disclaimer on the cover of IRS 
Publication 17 does little to illuminate specific IRS simplifications. 
The effect of such opacity is that IRS simplifications can ironically 
decrease taxpayers’ knowledge of the actual tax law, as it exists in the Internal 
Revenue Code, Treasury regulations, and case law. While taxpayers could 
theoretically reject statements in IRS publications and research the underlying 
tax law, the purpose of these statements is to ensure that many taxpayers and 
advisors need not access the underlying tax law to determine tax liability or 
answer questions. Indeed, the lack of notice or explanation of the changes, and 
limited disclosure, means that most taxpayers do not know that the IRS 
simplifications differ from the underlying law. 
Public knowledge of the government’s actions in enacting and applying the 
law—including the tax law—is an essential feature of democracy.309 By 
diminishing the public knowledge of the tax law and tax administration, 
simplexity threatens two attributes of democratic governance: public debate of 
the government’s laws and actions and accountability of the government to the 
public. 
Simplexity inhibits the readiness of the public to debate the actual tax law. 
For example, while Congress included the terms “ordinary and necessary” in 
§ 162(a) to describe a broad group of expenses that may be deducted 
immediately, the IRS’s presentation of the definition of the term “ordinary” 
significantly narrows the meaning of the law.310 Yet it is possible that Congress 
 
 306 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 307 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 276, at 1. 
 308 See Actions Relating to Decisions of the Tax Court, supra note 303 (statement of nonacquiescence 
regarding Media Space, Inc. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 424 (2010), vacated, 477 Fed. Appx. 857 (2nd Cir. 2012)). 
 309 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Yancey (Jan. 6, 1816) (“[I]f a nation expects to be 
ignorant & free, in a state of civilisation, it expects what never was & never will be.”); see also RAWLS, supra 
note 296; Schauer, supra note 296. 
 310 See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
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intended to create ambiguity in enacting this statute in order to enable the IRS 
and courts to consider many types of expenses as qualifying for deductibility. 
As a result of the IRS simplification, public discussion and debate over the 
meaning of the terms in § 162(a) may start from a baseline of false clarity 
created by the IRS rather than one of intentional ambiguity created by 
Congress. 
Simplexity also prevents the public from holding Congress accountable for 
its tax laws, an important function of tax transparency.311 When the IRS 
presents a seemingly clear depiction of complex tax law, the public may not 
urge Congress to revisit flawed statutes. For instance, one could argue that the 
vague standard set forth by Congress regarding what expenses must be 
capitalized may simply be inadministrable.312 The extensive debate over the 
capitalization rules and the voluminous regulations on the topic may suggest as 
much.313 However, by offering taxpayers mental shortcuts and rules of thumb, 
IRS simplifications create an end-run around such discussion. As a result, 
simplexity may prevent Congress from being held accountable for overly 
complex tax law. 
Additionally, there are few opportunities for the public to hold the IRS 
accountable for its role in creating IRS simplifications. Courts only focus on 
them in litigation if a taxpayer claims reliance on a statement in an IRS 
publication and the IRS disowns the statement. Even in such instances, courts 
routinely hold that the IRS cannot be held to its statements in IRS publications, 
and therefore do not evaluate them.314 Oversight institutions, such as 
congressional committees, are unlikely to question IRS simplifications because 
the lack of public knowledge about them prevents the public scrutiny necessary 
to engender outside review of the IRS.315 And, unlike with Treasury 
regulations,316 no law requires the IRS to provide the public with a notice and 
comment period for IRS publications. 
 
 311 For discussion of the accountability function, see Waldron, supra note 296. See also Fenster, supra 
note 296, at 899 (framing transparency as empowering the public to “monitor government activity”). 
 312 See I.R.C. § 263 (2012) (disallowing a deduction for “[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for 
permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate”).  
 313 See supra notes 160–61. 
 314 See supra note 277. 
 315 For a contrasting example, see Robert Costa & Jose A. DelReal, Hearings Floated as Hill Republicans 
Seize on Gruber Obamacare Comments, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/11/12/hearings-floated-as-hill-republicans-seize-on-gruber-obamacare-
comments/. 
 316 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2012).  
BLANK_OSOFSKY GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/10/2017 10:59 AM 
242 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:189 
A potential response to this criticism of simplexity is that its costs are 
justified because it enables taxpayers to complete and file their tax returns. For 
example, scholars such as Michael Graetz,317 Kathleen DeLaney Thomas,318 
and Lawrence Zelenak319 have argued that the tax law must not be so complex 
that it prevents individuals from embracing their civic duty to report and pay 
their taxes correctly. Yet when the IRS offers simplifying descriptions of the 
tax law, it may relieve other institutions, namely Congress or the Treasury, of 
their obligation to simplify and improve the actual tax law and to do so through 
participatory and accountable processes. Simplexity thus often clashes with 
democratic values of transparency, accountability, and participation. 
2. Unequal Benefits and Burdens 
Advocates of plain language have argued that this form of communication 
will ensure that taxpayers have equal access to government programs and 
services.320 Yet simplexity can have the opposite effect in the context of tax 
planning. As discussed above, some IRS simplifications benefit the 
government, while others benefit the taxpayer.321 As this subpart will show, 
sophisticated taxpayers can reject IRS simplifications that benefit the 
government, while all taxpayers, sophisticated and unsophisticated alike, will 
generally follow IRS simplifications that favor taxpayers. As a result, 
simplexity creates unequal benefits and burdens. 
Most taxpayers can and will adopt pro-taxpayer IRS simplifications. For 
reasons discussed previously, most taxpayers will not realize that IRS 
simplifications deviate from the underlying tax law, and therefore will 
unwittingly follow them.322 Sophisticated taxpayers may identify certain IRS 
simplifications.323 However, even for such taxpayers, following pro-taxpayer 
IRS simplifications will be a safe option. While taxpayers cannot rely upon 
these statements as a legal matter in court,324 most tax returns are never 
audited, much less litigated.325 As a result, most taxpayers who follow pro-
taxpayer IRS simplifications will enjoy the benefit of them without any IRS 
 
 317 GRAETZ, supra note 72. 
 318 Thomas, supra note 32. 
 319 Zelenak, supra note 36. 
 320 See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 321 See supra Part III.B. 
 322 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 323 See infra text accompanying notes 328–34.  
 324 See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 325 See Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 241, 249–50 (2013). 
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challenge. As examples such as Bobrow326 reveal, even in the rare instance in 
which the IRS challenges a taxpayer for following a pro-taxpayer IRS 
simplification and wins, the IRS will only face pressure to concede the issue as 
to other taxpayers until the publication is changed.327 As a result, it is rare for 
the IRS to audit and challenge a taxpayer’s adoption of a pro-taxpayer IRS 
simplification. Sophisticated and unsophisticated taxpayers alike therefore will 
generally follow and get the benefit of pro-taxpayer IRS simplifications. 
Sophisticated taxpayers, however, possess the unique ability to reject IRS 
simplifications that benefit the government. Sophisticated taxpayers have 
greater access to sound tax guidance, and are therefore less likely to follow 
taxpayer-unfriendly guidance offered by the IRS.328 While a wide swath of 
taxpayers, even sophisticated taxpayers and their advisors, are exposed to IRS 
simplifications,329 sophisticated taxpayers (or their advisors) are more likely to 
look beyond IRS publications and examine the underlying Internal Revenue 
Code, Treasury regulations, and case law. They are also more likely to have 
access to a broader set of IRS administrative guidance, which may provide 
taxpayers with support to reject an IRS simplification that benefits the 
government. 
Consider the example of the IRS simplification regarding annuity 
distributions that avoid the early IRA distribution penalty.330 As discussed 
previously, in technical guidance, the IRS has conceded that the three methods 
of distribution set forth in the IRS publication “do not represent the only 
distribution methods which will satisfy the requirements of Section 
72(t)(2)(A)(iv) of the Code.”331 Indeed, the IRS has issued private letter rulings 
allowing particular taxpayers to use distribution methods other than those set 
forth in the IRS publication.332 However, this more technical guidance is not 
equally accessible to all taxpayers. Private letter rulings are expensive and 
difficult to obtain, and therefore unlikely to be sought by or granted to the 
average taxpayer.333 More generally, both private letter rulings and IRS 
 
 326 No. 7022-11, T.C.M. 2014-21. 
 327 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 199. 
 328 Cauble, supra note 41, at 427, 429, 451, 463–65; see also Bryan T. Camp, Theory and Practice in Tax 
Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV. 227, 264 (2009). 
 329 See infra Part III.C. 
 330 See supra text accompanying notes 217–22.  
 331 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9008073 (Nov. 30, 1989). 
 332 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.  
 333 See Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 1 (listing requirements for private letter rulings, as well as list of 
fees).  
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Notices are part of a panoply of technical guidance that the IRS issues, which 
experienced practitioners routinely access to advise sophisticated clients.334 In 
contrast, less sophisticated taxpayers or advisors are unlikely to access (or 
know about) such guidance.335 Less sophisticated taxpayers therefore access a 
much smaller set of choices offered by the simplification in the IRS 
publication, such as the simplification that taxpayers must use one of the three 
distribution methods set forth in the IRS publication to avoid a penalty.336 
Sophisticated taxpayers therefore enjoy the best of both worlds: the ability to 
use taxpayer-favorable IRS simplifications and the ability to reject pro-
government IRS simplifications. 
Sophisticated taxpayers, with greater awareness of the underlying tax law, 
may decide to reject both pro-government and pro-taxpayer IRS 
simplifications. To the extent that such IRS simplifications exist in almost 
equal measure, the effect on taxpaying may simply net out. However, this 
potential netting is unlikely. First, to the extent that pro-government IRS 
simplifications are more frequent than pro-taxpayer IRS simplifications, 
sophisticated taxpayers rejecting all IRS simplifications would still put 
themselves at an advantage relative to the majority of taxpayers who follow 
IRS simplifications. Second, by recognizing the more complex rules, 
sophisticated taxpayers have the opportunity to reject pro-government IRS 
simplifications and embrace pro-taxpayer IRS simplifications, whether or not 
they actually do so. This choice is a valuable option, whether or not 
sophisticated taxpayers exercise it.337 
Scholars have presented a number of scenarios under which the IRS should 
screen taxpayers to determine whether they belong to different types, and to 
impose different costs on each type. For instance, some scholars have argued 
that from an optimal tax theory perspective, the government should require 
screening of high- and low-ability taxpayers and impose higher costs on higher 
ability taxpayers in order to redistribute most efficiently.338 Separately, Alex 
 
 334 See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 
¶ 110.6 (2015) (describing extensive IRS guidance in treatise).  
 335 Cauble, supra note 41, at 423.  
 336 See supra text accompanying note 220.  
 337 Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the Federal Income 
Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 31–32 (2010) (exploring the consequences of allowing choice in tax 
planning).  
 338 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Economics of “Tagging” as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, 
Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 8 (1978); Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, 
Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of Widely Available Genetic Information, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 843, 847–49 
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Raskolnikov has argued that the government should screen between taxpayers 
based on their dispositions toward tax compliance and impose different costs 
on different taxpayers based on such dispositions.339 For instance, by screening 
to distinguish between taxpayers who are inclined to comply with the tax 
system as long as the government offers helpful service and taxpayers who are 
inclined to comply only if the tax penalties are high enough, Raskolnikov 
suggests that the government can target helpful taxpayer service toward the 
former group and higher tax penalties toward the latter.340 
However, the inadvertent screening created by IRS simplifications is the 
precise opposite of the screening suggested by tax scholars. Sophisticated 
taxpayers are generally better off, as a group, relative to other taxpayers. And 
yet, because of the enhanced choice not to follow pro-government IRS 
simplifications, sophisticated taxpayers will tend to bear less of a burden from 
simplexity. In other words, simplexity likely imposes the lowest costs on the 
best-off taxpayers. As for Raskolnikov’s screening proposal in the tax 
compliance context, the opacity of IRS simplifications means that it is not 
possible to conclude that taxpayers are choosing to follow them or reject them, 
as the case may be, due to their underlying tax compliance dispositions. 
Rather, IRS simplifications likely impose greater burdens on less informed 
taxpayers, an inequitable result that is not justified by any existing screening 
theory. 
3. Inadequacy of Administrative Law to Police Threats 
Can administrative law address the threats to tax transparency and the 
inequitable distribution of benefits and burdens that can result from 
simplexity? Administrative law, after all, creates a rulemaking framework 
designed to ensure that procedures apply to infuse agency pronouncements 
regarding the law with public participation and, therefore, democratic 
legitimacy. However, despite this promise, administrative law does not 
adequately resolve the adverse effects of simplexity. 
The administrative law framework, established under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), divides agency pronouncements into different 
 
(2008); N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of 
Utilitarian Income Redistribution, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 155 (2010); David A. Weisbach, Toward a 
New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 47, 71–82.  
 339 Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009).  
 340 Id.  
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categories, which are designed to reflect different levels of influence over the 
law. Principally, the APA divides agency pronouncements into legislative rules 
and nonlegislative rules.341 Legislative rules can create new legal rights and 
duties that bind the agency and the public.342 Accordingly, agencies must issue 
legislative rules through demanding notice and comment procedures, which are 
designed to ensure meaningful public participation in the rulemaking process 
and judicial review of it.343 Nonlegislative rules, which are comprised of 
interpretive rules and policy statements, cannot create new legal rights and 
duties that are binding on the public.344 Instead, interpretive rules set forth the 
agency’s own interpretation of existing law,345 and policy statements indicate 
how the agency intends to exercise its discretion with respect to the law.346 
Given their more limited functions, nonlegislative rules do not have to be 
issued through notice and comment procedures.347 Consequently, regulated 
parties should not be compelled to comply with an agency’s pronouncement of 
new legal rights and duties unless, among other things,348 the pronouncement is 
issued through notice and comment procedures.349 
 
 341 The APA does not apply the terms “legislative rules” and “nonlegislative rules.” For discussion, see, 
for example, Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 473 n.26 (2013); 
Frederic P. Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1940). The APA also exempts 
other rules, such as procedural rules, from notice and comment procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).  
 342 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979) (“[P]roperly promulgated, substantive 
agency regulations have the ‘force and effect of law.’”); Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 
F.3d 592, 602 (5th Cir. 1995) (“‘[L]egislative rules’ are those which create law . . . .” (quoting Brown Express 
v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1979))).  
 343 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 for the requirements set forth in the APA for issuance of legislative rules. Courts 
have elaborated on these requirements significantly. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 6.1, at 407 (5th ed. 2010). 
 344 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1152 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(“[N]onlegislative rules do not have the force of law . . . .”). 
 345 See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“‘Interpretive 
rules’ . . . clarify or explain existing law or regulations . . . .”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 
1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985). 
 346 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“A policy 
statement announces the agency’s tentative intentions for the future.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947). 
 347 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).  
 348 Issuance of a legislative rule also must occur pursuant to a congressional grant of power. See, e.g., 
United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). Moreover, in order to be upheld, a legislative rule 
must withstand “hard look” review. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  
 349 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the 
Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1314, 1379 (1992); 
Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. 
L. REV. 520, 573–74 (1977) (asserting that notice and comment procedures “facilitate democratic 
participation”).  
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There are several obstacles to applying this rulemaking framework to IRS 
simplifications. First, despite the theoretical clarity of the categories of rules 
set forth above, such categories, as applied, have “been described . . . as 
‘tenuous,’ ‘fuzzy,’ ‘blurred,’ and, perhaps most picturesquely, ‘enshrouded in 
considerable smog.’”350 These general difficulties apply with at least equal 
force in the case of IRS simplifications.351 
One could make plausible arguments that various IRS simplifications could 
fit into any one of the three categories of rules. In terms of nonlegislative rules, 
one could plausibly argue that at least some IRS simplifications merely 
represent the IRS’s own interpretation of the statute, regulations, or judicial 
doctrine,352 therefore comfortably fitting in the interpretive rules category.353 
Alternatively, to the extent that an IRS simplification goes beyond merely 
interpreting existing law, one could argue that it explains how the IRS intends 
to exercise its enforcement discretion and, as such, it is merely a policy 
statement.354 However, relying on various judicial tests for distinguishing 
between nonlegislative and legislative rules, one could make a reasonable 
argument that at least some IRS simplifications are, in reality, procedurally 
invalid legislative rules, rather than either interpretive rules or policy 
statements. For instance, one could argue that IRS simplifications (such as the 
 
 350 Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); see also Jacob 
E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1705 (2007) (referring to “[t]he distinction 
between legislative rules and nonlegislative rules” as “one of the most confusing in administrative law”).  
 351 Courts have obliquely addressed IRS simplifications, albeit in cases that were not focused on 
administrative law. Adler v. Comm’r, 330 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1964); Miller v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 184, 195 
(2000) (“Administrative guidance contained in IRS publications is not binding on the Government . . . .”); 
Zimmerman v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 367, 371 (1978) (“[A]uthoritative sources of Federal tax law are . . . not 
in . . . informal [IRS] publications.”). Other courts have held that “IRS publications, though ‘aimed at 
explaining existing tax law to taxpayers,’ do not have the force of law.” United States v. Josephberg, 562 F.3d 
478, 498 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 264, 266 (2003)).  
 352 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1045, 1046 
(2000).  
 353 The disclaimer at the beginning of IRS Publication 17 states that “[t]he explanations and examples in 
this publication reflect the interpretation by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of: Tax laws enacted by 
Congress, Treasury regulations, and Court decisions.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 276. However, 
as discussed earlier, the disclaimer only appears on the cover of Publication 17, creating ambiguity about 
whether or not it should carry any weight in characterizing other IRS publications. Moreover, many courts 
have concluded that the label an agency uses certainly is not dispositive. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. 
OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that an agency’s label is “indicative but not 
dispositive”). 
 354 See, e.g., Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the 
Secretary of Labor’s enforcement guidelines were mere policy statements). But see, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 
818 F.2d at 947–49 (holding that FDA aflatoxin action levels were procedurally invalid legislative rules).  
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IRS’s description of capitalization requirements)355 that appear to “effectively 
amend[] a prior legislative rule” (such as the capitalization regulation)356 are 
procedurally invalid legislative rules.357 Relying on another line of authority, 
one could argue that IRS simplifications that transform broad standards into 
detailed rules (such as the IRS’s specification of required distribution methods 
for early IRA distributions)358 may be procedurally invalid legislative rules.359 
Finally, as another theory, one could rely on a line of judicial authority to 
argue that if the IRS treats its descriptions in IRS publications as “for all 
practical purposes ‘binding,’”360 then they could be procedurally invalid 
legislative rules, even if the IRS does not actually claim that they are legally 
binding.361 At bottom, exactly what IRS simplifications are under the APA 
depends on which statement is being analyzed and what authority is being 
applied.362 
Even if it were clear what IRS simplifications are under the APA 
framework, it is unlikely that the APA framework would actually be applied in 
practice. Imagine, for instance, that IRS simplifications are clearly mere policy 
statements. Does this mean that taxpayers will not be compelled to comply 
with them? As a legal matter, the answer to this question should be yes. 
However, in order to answer yes to this question from a practical perspective, 
 
 355 See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
 356 See supra notes 161–68. 
 357 Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
 358 See supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text. 
 359 Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Hoctor v. USDA, 82 
F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996). But see, e.g., Mora-Meraz v. Thomas, 601 F.3d 933, 942–43 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the Bureau of Prison’s twelve-month rule for meeting a “drug abuse problem” was an interpretive 
rule).  
 360 See, e.g., Appalachian Power v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This analysis can easily 
swallow up the policy statement category. For this reason, many commentators have critiqued the practically 
binding test. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 343, § 6.3, at 426.  
 361 The IRS, at times, treats its statements in IRS publications not only as interpretations or triggers for 
enforcement, but as the law itself. In briefs, the IRS cites to IRS publications to support its arguments 
regarding the law. See, e.g., Answering Brief for the Appellee at 24, Mingo v. Comm’r, 773 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 
2014) (No. 13-60801), 2014 WL 1664220, at *24; Opening Brief for Respondent, Ostrow v. Comm’r, 122 
T.C. 378 (2004) (No. 6325-03), 2004 WL 1514961, at *18 n.6; Brief for Respondent at 23, Green Forest Mfg., 
v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020 (2003) (No. 1596-01), 2002 WL 34358358, at *23. Further, the IRS has 
argued that a taxpayer’s failure to consult IRS publications, or the taxpayer taking a position in conflict with 
relevant IRS publications, justifies imposition of an accuracy-based penalty. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee, 
Au v. Comm’r, 482 Fed. App’x 289 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-70270), 2011 WL 2679983, at *3, *15–16; Brief 
for Appellee at 47–48, Tavano v. Comm’r, 986 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1993) (No. 91-4078), 1992 WL 12135722 
at *47–48; Respondent’s Brief in Answer at 13, 30, Bernard v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (2012) (No. 
5787-10), 2012 WL 5494629.  
 362 Cf. Anthony, supra note 349, at 1331. 
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taxpayers who access IRS publications to complete their tax returns would 
have to actually know that they are mere policy statements. This is unlikely to 
be the case for the vast majority of taxpayers, who not only are unlikely to 
know what IRS simplifications are from an APA perspective, but also that they 
even diverge from applicable tax law. 
Some might argue that this compelled compliance as a practical matter 
simply means that IRS simplifications are actually procedurally invalid 
legislative rules. As a result of this procedural invalidity, this argument would 
go, taxpayers could challenge the IRS’s failure to use notice and comment 
procedures. However, this argument suffers from the flawed assumption that 
most taxpayers will be alert to the administrative law categorizations. As 
discussed earlier, while a small percentage of well-advised taxpayers may be 
prepared to make an APA challenge, the vast majority of taxpayers who access 
IRS publications are unlikely to know what the rules are from an 
administrative law perspective, much less challenge them as a result of a 
purported procedural invalidity.363 
Even if a taxpayer challenged an IRS simplification in a tax controversy, 
the IRS still would not be compelled to revise the IRS simplification for other 
taxpayers. The IRS could concede the issue as to the taxpayer in the case 
privately, without litigation.364 Even if the taxpayer successfully litigated the 
case, the IRS could arguably preserve the IRS simplification unchanged on the 
grounds that it represents the IRS’s own view of the law. 
In sum, most taxpayers will comply with IRS simplifications with no 
consideration of what they are from an administrative law perspective. As a 
result, the administrative law rulemaking framework offers an inadequate 
solution to the threats of simplexity.365 
 
 363 A Westlaw search on July 7, 2015 for “IRS /p publication /p (APA or “administrative law”)” revealed 
no administrative law challenges to IRS publications. The search did reveal a handful of (rejected) appeals of 
criminal tax fraud convictions, in which the defendants claimed that the IRS’s failure to subject various tax 
forms (such as Form 1040) to notice and comment meant that taxpayers had no duty to file tax returns. See, 
e.g., United States v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1991). That APA challenges to IRS forms by 
taxpayers fighting criminal convictions are quite rare underscores the low likelihood of challenges to IRS 
publications. In addition, it is difficult for taxpayers to bring a preenforcement challenge. See, e.g., Kristin E. 
Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative 
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153 (2008).  
 364 See I.R.C. § 6103 (2012). 
 365 One possibility might be to subject all IRS simplifications to notice and comment procedures. See, e.g., 
Anthony, supra note 349, at 1315 (suggesting expansive use of notice and comment procedures). We address, 
and reject, this possibility. See infra notes 387–93 and accompanying text.  
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C. The Trade-Off 
Fundamentally, simplexity poses a trade-off between representing the tax 
law accurately and presenting it in accessible and understandable terms. In the 
context of lawmaking, scholars have examined the optimal complexity, or 
precision, of the law.366 They have argued that making the law more complex 
can have benefits, in terms of allowing for more fine-grained distinctions, 
which may better capture underlying values.367 However, making the law more 
complex can also have costs, including making it less comprehensible and 
more expensive to administer.368 Simplexity poses a similar trade-off. Greater 
simplexity results in a less complex presentation of the law. This makes the 
law more understandable (and therefore more administrable), but at the cost of 
a less accurate reflection of the underlying law. To the extent the underlying 
law reflects congressional preferences, greater simplexity may result in less 
adherence to the law’s underlying preferences. 
There is no universal answer to the question of how this trade-off should be 
resolved.369 Whether greater or less simplexity should exist depends both on: 
(1) how one values accuracy vs. understandability, and (2) whether the existing 
level of simplexity is too high or low, given the value placed on accuracy and 
understandability. Imagine, for instance, that, instead of explaining the 
possibility of claiming itemized deductions, and explaining all such 
deductions, the IRS simply states, “[y]ou must take a standard deduction of $X 
in the current taxable year.” Most would agree that this IRS simplification 
overvalues understandability, in that it ignores and obscures a whole slew of 
available deductions. In this case, simplexity would be too high. On the other 
hand, imagine that the IRS simply copies and pastes the entirety of the 
capitalization rules into the relevant IRS publication. Most would agree that 
this act would undervalue understandability, in that it would be impossible for 
nearly all taxpayers to understand their taxpaying obligations. In this case, 
 
 366 See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); 
Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995); Richard 
A. Epstein, The Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., 
Working Paper No. 210, 2004).  
 367 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 366, at 150 (positing that more complex rules are more closely tailored, 
thereby allowing for better control of behavior).  
 368 See, e.g., Diver, supra note 366, at 70–71 (discussing, among other things, the trade-off between 
accessibility and congruence); Kaplow, supra note 366, at 151 (discussing compliance and enforcement costs 
of complex rules).  
 369 Cf. Diver, supra note 366, at 76 (“The degree of precision appropriate to any particular rule depends 
on a series of variables peculiar to the rule’s author, enforcer, and addressee. As a consequence, 
generalizations about optimal rule precision are inherently suspect.”).  
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simplexity would be too low. Simplexity, therefore, is a characteristic of 
descriptions of the tax law, which can be too high or low in a given 
circumstance. 
Moreover, the benefits and costs of simplexity will vary in different 
contexts.370 For instance, the value of simplexity may be lower (and the 
potential costs more pernicious) when describing provisions relevant only to 
sophisticated taxpayers, who are least in need of the seemingly simple 
explanations, and who will be most capable of manipulating the simplexity. On 
the other hand, the value of simplexity may be higher when addressing 
provisions likely relevant to particularly unsophisticated taxpayers. Such 
taxpayers may have the most to gain from seemingly simple explanations and 
may be least likely to manipulate the simplexity. The case for simplexity may 
be highest still to the extent that the provisions are unlikely to be relevant to 
sophisticated taxpayers at all, thereby eliminating the concern that the 
understandability benefits to unsophisticated taxpayers will come with the cost 
of differential abilities to manipulate. Other factors may also affect the value of 
simplexity. For instance, simplexity may be more problematic when Congress 
deliberately intended the complexity of the underlying law to capture 
important values. On the other hand, simplexity may be more desirable when 
the complexity of the underlying law reflects poor drafting, rather than a desire 
to delineate subtle differences in tax treatment. 
In short, recognizing the concept of simplexity and its pervasive presence 
in IRS Publications opens the door for evaluating whether a desirable amount 
of simplexity exists. But determining whether a desirable amount of simplexity 
exists must occur through a case-by-case analysis. 
D. Potential Responses 
As the prior discussion illustrates, simplexity creates a trade-off between 
greater understandability and less accuracy. This subpart offers approaches for 
making simplexity more apparent. Doing so will make it easier to evaluate 
simplexity in a given case, as well as preserve some of the benefits of 
simplexity while responding to its drawbacks. 
 
 370 Cf. id. at 72–79 (fleshing out how various aspects of rule precision may matter more or less in different 
contexts).  
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1. Red-Flagging 
A strategy for making simplexity more apparent and maintaining many of 
the benefits of simplexity while minimizing its threats is to require the IRS not 
only to offer government-favorable IRS simplifications, but also to: (1) red-
flag IRS simplifications explicitly (through footnotes, notations, interactive 
online links, appendices, or other means), (2) explain that they represent safe-
harbor positions,371 and (3) briefly identify other reasonable interpretations of 
the tax law. The red-flagging approach has the benefits of allowing the IRS to 
explain the tax law in plain language and reveal the agency’s view of the tax 
law, or at least the view most favorable to the IRS. To the extent that 
conservative taxpayers follow the IRS-favorable view, the IRS can still 
maximize revenue. Indeed, requiring the IRS to begin by routinely simplifying 
in the government’s favor may prevent giveaways to taxpayers in the form of 
unwarranted pro-taxpayer IRS simplifications. Most importantly, this approach 
reduces opacity and may help level the playing field between different types of 
taxpayers. 
The red-flagging approach should go beyond mere placement of a 
disclaimer on each IRS publication regarding the possibility that the 
publication contains IRS simplifications. Such disclaimers, even if placed on 
all IRS publications, would be inadequate. First, as cognitive bias research has 
demonstrated, individuals regularly ignore disclaimers and focus instead on 
easily accessible explanations and examples.372 Drawing from empirical 
research conducted in other areas, there are significant reasons to suspect that 
general disclaimers would not cause taxpayers to significantly discount the 
description of the tax law in all IRS publications.373 Moreover, even if a 
general disclaimer on each publication made taxpayers wary of the guidance in 
the publications, the disclaimer would provide taxpayers with no roadmap 
 
 371 See Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1385 (2016).  
 372 See, e.g., Nick Ellis, Word Meaning and the Links Between the Verbal System and Modalities of 
Perception and Imagery or In Verbal Memory the Eyes See Vividly, but Ears Only Faintly Hear, Fingers 
Barely Feel and the Nose Doesn’t Know, in MENTAL IMAGES IN HUMAN COGNITION 313, 314 (Robert H. 
Logie & Michel Denis eds., 1991); Philip J. Mazzocco & Timothy C. Brock, Understanding the Role of 
Mental Imagery in Persuasion: A Cognitive Resources Model Analysis, in CREATING IMAGES AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF MARKETING COMMUNICATION 65 (Lynn R. Kahle & Chung-Hyun Kim eds., 2006) 
(describing the importance of the “vividness” of a story to the salience of images). 
 373 For behavioral analysis in other areas, see, for example, Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & 
David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Hazard Communication: Warnings and 
Risk, in 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 106 (1996) (reporting inadequacy of prescription drug 
warnings). For a general discussion, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81. 
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regarding what guidance amounted to an IRS simplification and what the 
various, possible interpretations of the tax law actually are. As a result, general 
disclaimers would, at best, cause taxpayers to disregard IRS publications 
entirely, without providing any specific path forward for taxpayers who need 
guidance to fill out their tax returns. In contrast, a red-flagging system, with 
explanations of the various possibilities in footnotes, notations, interactive 
online links, or appendices, could provide constructive, transparent guidance 
for sophisticated and unsophisticated taxpayers alike. 
The red-flagging approach may have additional benefits. Requiring the IRS 
to make different interpretations of the tax law apparent (and highlighting the 
pro-government IRS simplification) could create the opportunity to screen to 
distinguish between different taxpayers based on which version they choose. 
For instance, the IRS—or return preparation software developers374—could 
present taxpayers with the option of applying the safe harbor version of the law 
represented by IRS simplifications, or a more pro-taxpayer version of the law 
set forth in the alternatives presented. The IRS may then be able to require 
taxpayers to reveal which version of the law they are applying.375 This 
information would provide the IRS with valuable information regarding 
compliance profiles, which is lost absent the explicit choice by taxpayers to 
follow (or not to follow) simplifications. 
The red-flagging approach is not without potential weaknesses. First, red-
flagging would impose an additional requirement on a resource-constrained 
IRS. However, imposing this cost on the IRS may be merited in light of the 
resulting increased transparency. Moreover, in drafting IRS simplifications 
currently, the agency is presumably already researching the law enough to 
reveal both IRS simplifications and the other possibilities. As a result, while 
revealing the information already in the IRS’s possession would impose some 
additional cost, this cost may not be insurmountable. 
 
 374 Tax return preparation software companies already charge different amounts for different products 
based on the level of tax return complexity. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-297, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: MANY TAXPAYERS RELY ON TAX SOFTWARE AND IRS NEEDS TO ASSESS ASSOCIATED 
RISKS 3–4 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/286461.pdf. One could imagine tax preparation software 
companies developing different products, which reflect the different versions of the law set forth by the IRS, 
and an accompanying insurance market developing based on the version of the law the taxpayer chooses, 
thereby resulting in different prices for the different versions.  
 375 For another proposed screening strategy, see, for example, Raskolnikov, supra note 339, at 718–19, 
737–38. 
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Some might also object that the red-flagging approach would reduce the 
simplicity, and therefore usability, of the IRS’s guidance.376 However, red-
flagging could be designed in a way that minimizes the increased burden it 
imposes. Online versions of IRS publications could have interactive links that 
identify IRS simplifications and other possibilities, where applicable. Printed 
versions could contain such information in separate supplements. 
Red-flagging would create a new screening dynamic, but rather than 
screening based simply on how well-advised the taxpayer already is, the new 
red-flagging system would screen based on how much the taxpayer cares about 
reducing tax liability. Those taxpayers who seek to minimize tax liability can 
bear the additional costs of reading interactive links and supplements. Those 
taxpayers who wish to avoid added complexity can still do so by not clicking 
the interactive links or reading the supplements. 
Moreover, while it is easy to criticize red-flagging as increasing 
complexity, it is important to remember that the complexity and ambiguity of 
the underlying tax law is truly at fault. Maintenance of the status quo is 
unlikely to result in simplicity through reform of the actual underlying tax 
law.377 Red-flagging could provide the impetus needed to encourage 
policymakers to address the complexity and ambiguity of the tax law.378 
An additional concern, however, is that red-flagging may inadvertently 
introduce informational differences between taxpayers who can understand the 
information provided by a red-flagging system and those who cannot.379 As 
Joe Bankman has pointed out, more than 20% of the population lacks the 
ability to engage in tasks such as reading food labels or reading a simple 
story.380 For such taxpayers, the potential benefits of the red-flagging system 
would be minimal. Red-flagging may thereby present a new, problematic 
screening dimension. 
However, this concern is not unique to the red-flagging system. Any tax 
system that offers tax planning opportunities is going to uniquely burden those 
 
 376 See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 72, at 82 (1997).  
 377 Cf. Austan Goolsbee, The TurboTax Revolution: Can Technology Solve Tax Complexity?, in THE 
CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 124, 128 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).  
 378 For example, with mixed success, some countries have created initiatives to rewrite the underlying tax 
law in plain language, rather than just creating a veneer of simplifications that overlays an unchanged set of 
complex laws. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 71, at 115–17.  
 379 This can be characterized as a horizontal equity problem, whereby reducing inequity between two sets 
of taxpayers can often increase inequity relative to a third set.  
 380 Bankman, supra note 31, at 1431.  
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taxpayers who are least capable of understanding it. For example, research 
regarding flexible spending accounts reveals that these tax savings vehicles are 
more likely to be used by taxpayers with higher education and higher capacity 
to make complex assessments.381 Moreover, that some taxpayers will not have 
the capacity to understand or use the red-flagging system cannot justify 
continuing to maintain the opacity of IRS simplifications. 
Another reasonable objection to red-flagging is that it may create a road 
map for taxpayers to be aggressive. However, it is not clear that taxpayers will 
respond to red-flagging by being more aggressive. To the extent that pro-
taxpayer IRS simplifications currently exist, taxpayers may unknowingly be 
following them already. If the default is set to pro-government IRS 
simplifications in the red-flagging system, many taxpayers may simply follow 
the default. The red-flagging system will make both the pro-government 
simplifications and the other possibilities apparent. However, it is not clear 
whether taxpayers will choose such other possibilities or follow the pro-
government IRS simplifications. As scholars have noted, taxpayers comply 
with the tax law for all sorts of different reasons.382 Many taxpayers may 
simply desire to adopt conservative tax positions and may appreciate the 
government’s presentation of these positions.383 
Finally, even if a taxpayer would not ordinarily claim an aggressive tax 
position, some may argue that red-flagging would highlight the complexity and 
ambiguity of the tax law, leading some taxpayers to believe that others are 
exploiting it to claim aggressive tax positions.384 This belief may undermine 
confidence in the tax system, thereby encouraging taxpayers to take aggressive 
positions in anticipation of others doing so as well (a backlash effect).385 This 
concern, however, is overstated. It is no secret that the tax system is complex. 
 
 381 Roger Feldman & Jennifer Schultz, Who Uses Flexible Spending Accounts: Effects of Employee 
Characteristics and Employer Strategies, 39 MED. CARE 661, 661 (2001); Barton H. Hamilton & James 
Marton, Employee Choice of Flexible Spending Account Participation and Health Plan, 17 HEALTH ECON. 
793, 803–04 (2008).  
 382 See Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 112 (2009); 
Raskolnikov, supra note 339, at 696–97; Joel Slemrod, Introduction to WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX 
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).  
 383 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 382, at 137–38 (examining how convictions about duty, honesty, and 
citizenship may compel compliance for certain taxpayers); Raskolnikov, supra note 339, at 719 (positing that 
some taxpayers want to take the conservative tax reporting position).  
 384 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 71, at 109. 
 385 Id.; Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267, 1290 
(“[P]erception of hopelessly complex and inequitable tax laws . . . leads some potentially honest taxpayers to 
attitudes of noncompliance.”).  
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Red-flagging simply may provide a more coherent road map of some of the 
complexity and ambiguity. 
Alternatively, if red-flagging provides too much information regarding 
potential, aggressive positions, an alternative would be to have the IRS simply 
annotate its publications with links to all the sources of law that the IRS is 
relying upon. These links would also create greater transparency and create 
less additional information for taxpayers to read. However, it would also serve 
as a less clear source of guidance regarding what, exactly, the alternative 
potential tax positions are. Whether red-flagging or annotation is the preferable 
approach depends on how easily one wants to allow less-sophisticated 
taxpayers to find alternative, more aggressive positions. If putting taxpayers on 
equal footing is a particularly important value, then red-flagging should be 
preferred over annotation. However, if providing a greater measure of 
transparency while making it less likely that taxpayers will take more 
aggressive tax positions is more important, annotation should be preferred. 
2. Review of IRS Publications 
The exclusive application of a red-flagging system or an annotation system, 
however, may not be enough to address the adverse effects of simplexity. 
Without oversight or review, the IRS may lack the proper incentives or even 
ability to create and maintain a sufficiently robust red-flagging system.386 
Indeed, in some cases the IRS may not fully realize that there are other 
available legal positions. In such cases, the IRS would not be able to offer 
meaningful red-flagging or annotation. A complementary reform would subject 
the IRS’s process to outside review. 
One possibility for review of IRS simplifications would be to require all 
IRS publications to undergo notice and comment procedures. Requiring notice 
and comment procedures for all IRS publications, regardless of whether they 
are actually interpretive rules or policy statements, could sidestep the difficult 
administrative law classification questions discussed previously, and ensure 
that the purported democratic legitimacy offered by notice and comment apply 
in any event. 
 
 386 The IRS’s informal mechanisms for receiving feedback regarding its publications do not necessarily 
produce meaningful comments. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-34, TAX ADMINISTRATION: 
IRS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE FORMS AND PUBLICATIONS 8 (1994). IRS publications are not subject to more 
formal processes, such as OMB review. Id. at 3.  
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However, this form of review should be rejected. Even within the 
administrative law paradigm, many scholars question how much notice and 
comment procedures really do ensure democratic legitimacy, and question 
whether the benefits are worth the costs.387 As applied to IRS Publications, 
notice and comment is a costly and likely ineffective means of ensuring this 
transmission of information from the IRS to the public. However, it may be 
useful to enlist the tax law bar and other tax professionals in a less formal 
process whereby they can create crowd-sourced (wiki-type) annotations on IRS 
Publications. The IRS can review such annotations for accuracy. But, the 
annotating process may alert the IRS to various sources of authority of which it 
was not aware and help create more accurate simplifications. 
As an alternative, a separate organization charged with monitoring the IRS 
could review the IRS’s red-flagging of its own publications and seek to ensure 
that sufficient information is transmitted to the public. A plethora of 
organizations is charged with monitoring the IRS, including the IRS Oversight 
Board, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Taxpayer Advocate 
Service.388 Of such organizations, either the TIGTA, or the GAO, or both 
would be well suited to review the red-flagging of IRS simplifications.389 
Indeed, both the TIGTA and the GAO have reviewed the IRS’s provision of 
taxpayer assistance by telephone, the IRS’s preparation of low-income tax 
returns, and other taxpayer services to assess the quality of the IRS’s 
 
 387 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492–93 (1992). Common 
critiques include that the public generally has very little engagement with such procedures. See, e.g., Cary 
Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2006). 
Another oft-cited concern is that imposing the extensive procedures on an agency may simply discourage the 
agency from issuing guidance altogether. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, 
and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 284 (2010). As applied to IRS simplifications, requiring 
notice and comment could reduce the volume of the IRS’s publications, leaving taxpayers with less useful 
guidance.  
 388 See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 23–24. 
 389 In contrast, the Taxpayer Advocate Service and the IRS Oversight Board are unattractive possibilities. 
The Taxpayer Advocate Service is charged principally with protecting taxpayers from the IRS. This charge is 
at least somewhat in conflict with objective analysis of IRS publications designed to ensure that both pro-
government and pro-taxpayer IRS simplifications are identified. Samuel D. Brunson, Watching the Watchers: 
Preventing I.R.S. Abuse of the Tax System, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 223, 252–53 (2013). The IRS Oversight Board 
faces severe resource issues, with six of its nine seats unfilled. Robert M. Tobias, Effective January 1, 2015, 
There Are Six Open Seats for IR Oversight Board Members, IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://www.treasury.gov/ 
IRSOB/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). Moreover, the IRS Oversight Board may not 
engage in tax policy decisions. I.R.C. § 7802(C)(ii) (2012).  
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performance as well as to help the IRS develop a sound methodology to 
evaluate its own service.390 
Review of IRS publications should be searching to be effective. In the early 
1990s, the GAO reviewed IRS publications and such review did not identify 
the need for any substantive changes.391 However, the GAO methodology in 
this review was quite limited, in that it reviewed only four IRS publications.392 
Moreover, it is unclear whether the GAO was looking for IRS 
simplifications.393 If the GAO were charged with identifying not only clearly 
incorrect statements of the law, but also IRS simplifications, and ensuring that 
such IRS simplifications are appropriately red-flagged—with reasonable, 
alternative possibilities clearly identified—then the GAO review may serve as 
a useful backstop to the IRS’s own red-flagging. 
3. Structural Reform 
In some cases, red-flagging of IRS simplifications, backstopped by review, 
may not be a viable option. Aside from IRS publications, the IRS makes 
simplifying statements in real-time interactions with taxpayers in other fora. 
For instance, the IRS provides extensive advice to taxpayers over the telephone 
and in Taxpayer Assistance Centers.394 While the IRS can, and does, prescribe 
what types of questions it will answer in certain contexts395 and trains its 
employees to answer such questions,396 the IRS cannot constrain its employees 
to stay within these boundaries in all cases, nor can the IRS provide a prepared 
 
 390 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 10-225, 2009 TAX FILING SEASON: IRS MET 
MANY 2009 GOALS, BUT TELEPHONE ACCESS REMAINED LOW, AND TAXPAYER SERVICE AND ENFORCEMENT 
COULD BE IMPROVED (2009); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-782, TAX ADMINISTRATION: 
IRS NEEDS BETTER STRATEGIC PLANNING AND EVALUATION OF TAXPAYER ASSISTANCE TRAINING (2005); 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-189, IRS TELEPHONE ASSISTANCE: QUALITY OF SERVICE MIXED IN 
THE 2000 FILING SEASON AND BELOW IRS’ LONG-TERM GOAL 2 (2001).  
 391 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-72, TAX ADMINISTRATION: SELECTED IRS FORMS, 
PUBLICATIONS, AND NOTICES COULD BE IMPROVED (1993).  
 392 Id. at 1, 4, 16.  
 393 Id. at 1, 16. 
 394 Contact Your Local IRS Office, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/help-resources/ 
contact-your-local-irs-office (last updated July 1, 2016); Let Us Help You, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/telephone-assistance (last updated June 21, 2016). 
 395 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2005-40-021, CUSTOMER SERVICE AT 
THE TAXPAYER ASSISTANCE CENTERS IS IMPROVING BUT IS STILL NOT MEETING EXPECTATIONS 4 (2004).  
 396 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-782, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS NEEDS BETTER 
STRATEGIC PLANNING AND EVALUATION OF TAXPAYER ASSISTANCE TRAINING 5 (2005).  
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script that will apply to all fact patterns presented.397 For the same reasons that 
it is impossible for the IRS to provide a prepared answer to every real-time 
question in advance, it is also impossible for the IRS to provide red flags for 
every answer provided. In the absence of red flags, it would be problematic for 
the employee to believe her role is either pro-government or pro-taxpayer. 
Such a view would tend to skew simplifications in one direction or the other. 
As a result, employees who provide real-time advice to taxpayers may best 
be placed in a new independent taxpayer service organization, which has an 
identity as a neutral provider of tax information. For the same reasons that the 
Taxpayer Advocate Service’s independence from the IRS has been seen as 
essential to the institution’s ability to advocate on behalf of taxpayers,398 
creating a neutral identity for taxpayer service employees who provide tax 
advice to the public may be essential to ensure fair, reasonable advice in the 
absence of any of the previously prescribed red flags. 
Creating a separate unit of employees either within or apart from the IRS is 
certain to impose additional costs, as a result of increasing the infrastructure of 
the agency, and the inevitable organizational costs of segregating certain 
employees from others. To the extent that the IRS is able to red-flag most 
ambiguity that will arise in advance or limit IRS employees’ answers to only 
situations that do not require simplifications, this last strategy should be 
avoided. But separation may be necessary in certain situations. It should serve 
as a limit on the types of questions that IRS employees, in the given structure, 
should answer. This strategy is likely to become more relevant if the IRS 
increases interactivity with taxpayers during the tax return preparation process 
in the future, a potential development that is discussed below. 
E. The Future of Tax Administration 
The IRS’s use of plain language to explain otherwise complex tax law is 
not restricted to IRS publications, such as those discussed in this Article. 
Rather, IRS simplifications appear across the spectrum of taxpayer services. 
And if the IRS applies new innovations to aspects of tax administration over 
the coming decades, simplexity is only likely to increase. In anticipation of 
these possible developments, this subpart briefly forecasts possible emergence 
 
 397 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-189, IRS TELEPHONE ASSISTANCE: QUALITY OF SERVICE 
MIXED IN THE 2000 FILING SEASON AND BELOW IRS’ LONG-TERM GOAL 13–15 (2001); TREASURY INSPECTOR 
GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 395, at 2, 7.  
 398 See Camp, supra note 47, at 96. 
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of simplexity in some of the most prominent tax administration tax reform 
proposals: government-prepared tax returns, interactive tax return filing, and 
third-party reporting. 
Government-Prepared Tax Returns. In recent years, numerous government 
officials and scholars have advocated for the adoption of government-prepared 
tax returns to promote increased tax compliance and alleviate individuals’ 
filing costs.399 Under this approach, which has been implemented in 
California400 and outside the United States,401 the taxing authority would 
prepare portions of an individual’s tax return by inserting information that it 
has already received through third-party information reporting, such as salary 
and interest payments and family status.402 Taxpayers would have the right to 
make revisions to the information contained in the government-prepared tax 
return,403 though there is a high likelihood that many would confirm the IRS’s 
pre-filled return rather than face an increased risk of audit. 
In addition to reducing the return-filing burden on many individual 
taxpayers, government-prepared tax returns would also present powerful 
opportunities for the IRS to apply simplified versions of the tax law directly to 
individuals’ own personal tax circumstances. For instance, the IRS could 
create a default that automatically designates a wage earner’s receipt of 
additional income that is less than a certain amount, such as $600, as income 
earned from a hobby rather than a business activity. This default would serve a 
similar role as the IRS’s discussion of whether the taxpayer’s “livelihood” 
depends on the income in the hobby determination rules of IRS 
Publication 535.404 As another example, the IRS could automatically allocate a 
set percentage of a restaurant’s gross receipts, such as 10%, to the gross 
income of all waiters who work at the restaurant.405 This default would not be 
based on statutory or regulatory authority, but would communicate the IRS’s 
presumption regarding the restaurant’s total tip income. By incorporating 
 
 399 See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 31; Goolsbee, supra note 31; Mock & Shurtz, supra note 31; Ventry, 
supra note 31. 
 400 See STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., READYRETURN PILOT: TAX YEAR 2004 STUDY RESULTS 
(2006), http://www.ftb.ca.gov/readyReturn/TY04RRFinalReport.pdf. 
 401 See, e.g., David Wiles, Why Swedes Are Okay with Paying Taxes, SWEDISH INST., https://sweden.se/ 
society/why-swedes-are-okay-with-paying-taxes/ (last updated Jan. 8, 2016). 
 402 See STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., supra note 400. 
 403 See id. 
 404 See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text. 
 405 Current law contains a similar feature, calculated at 8% of total gross income. I.R.C. § 6053(c) (2012); 
Treas. Reg. § 31.6053-3(d) (2012). 
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defaults and presumptions in the government-prepared tax return, the IRS 
could signal legal outcomes to taxpayers, even if these outcomes are not 
necessarily required by the applicable tax law. 
Interactive Tax Return Filing. Several scholars have recommended that the 
IRS create interactive online mechanisms to assist taxpayers with their tax 
return filing obligations and provide them with tailored guidance.406 Currently, 
taxpayers who consult IRS publications and tax return forms receive uniform 
guidance even though their personal circumstances differ. As Joseph Bankman, 
Clifford Nass, and Joel Slemrod have noted, once taxpayers identify as part of 
a particular group, such as taxpayers who must file IRS Form 1040 with 
Schedule A, “each member receives the identical form with the identical 
questions.”407 In response, these scholars argue that the IRS should incorporate 
“conversational agents” into e-filing software, which ask specific questions 
based on the taxpayer’s type of employment, answers to prior questions, and 
other factors.408 They suggest that the conversational agent could also assume 
the role of auditor by adjusting the questions to uncover potential tax 
noncompliance.409 Likewise, in response to the length and density of current 
IRS publications, Kathleen DeLaney Thomas suggests that the IRS could 
create user-friendly websites that provide thematically-linked information on a 
specific topic, such as tax obligations related to household employees.410 
Each of these suggestions would reduce procedural complexity associated 
with tax return filing, but would also provide the IRS with enhanced 
opportunities to shape the tax law through simplexity. The IRS already directs 
its taxpayer assistance employees to answer all “in scope” questions from 
taxpayers by restating text from particular IRS publications.411 The proposals 
described above would amplify IRS simplifications through more 
technologically advanced means. For example, under Thomas’s approach, the 
IRS could use the household employee website to provide taxpayers with its 
own interpretation of otherwise ambiguous legal issues, such as whether an 
individual who provides childcare services should be treated as an employee 
for tax purposes.412 Similarly, under the Bankman, Nass, and Slemrod 
 
 406 See, e.g., Bankman, Nass & Slemrod, supra note 32; Mock & Shurtz, supra note 31; Thomas, supra 
note 32. 
 407 Bankman, Nass & Slemrod, supra note 32, at 17. 
 408 Id. at 18. 
 409 Id. 
 410 See Thomas, supra note 32. 
 411 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 395. 
 412 See Thomas, supra note 32, at 37–40. 
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proposal, the conversational agent could ask taxpayers questions about items 
that may not necessarily be subject to tax, such as certain employer 
reimbursements, in a way that nevertheless leads the taxpayer to include the 
amounts in income out of caution.413 
Third-Party Reporting. The government has increasingly instituted third-
party information reporting requirements as a means of assessing tax 
liability.414 In recent years, and often as a result of legislation, the IRS has 
expanded information-reporting requirements to apply to topics as diverse as 
offshore bank accounts,415 health insurance,416 basis in securities,417 and 
transactions that involve virtual currencies.418 Studies of individual tax 
reporting have found consistently that third-party information reporting 
correlates with high levels of tax compliance.419 As technological progress 
continues to enhance the ability of third parties, such as banks or individuals 
with children, to comply with information reporting requirements, the 
government is likely to increase its use of this tax enforcement device. 
While third-party information reporting is an important feature of modern 
tax administration, it also provides an outlet for IRS simplifications. Third-
party information reporting requirements enable the IRS to implicitly advise 
taxpayers that they should not engage in specific transactions. For instance, the 
“reportable transaction” rules, which require taxpayers and their advisors to 
file information reports with the IRS whenever a taxpayer engages in certain 
transactions, can signal to taxpayers that they should not engage in these 
transactions, even though they are not necessarily inconsistent with applicable 
tax law.420 Further, the IRS could use information reporting instructions to 
third parties to add administrative gloss to the underlying tax law. For 
example, by providing non-U.S. banks with new indicia of customers who 
should be subject to information reporting to the U.S., the IRS could create 
 
 413 Bankman, Nass & Slemrod, supra note 32, at 18. 
 414 For list of current information-reporting requirements, see supra note 33. 
 415 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CATALOG NO. 59612Q, 2015 INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
FORM 8966 (2015). 
 416 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 1095-C, EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH 
INSURANCE OFFER AND COVERAGE (2015). 
 417 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 8949, SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF 
CAPITAL ASSETS (2015). 
 418 I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938. 
 419 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, at 2 (2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%202010.pdf.  
 420 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(a), (b) (2016); see also Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: 
Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629 (2009). 
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information-reporting rules that extend beyond the requirements of applicable 
tax law.421 An underexplored feature of the information reporting approach, 
consequently, is how it can serve as an enhanced platform for IRS 
simplifications. 
Each of these examples illustrates how the IRS could extend its current 
approaches to simplifying the tax law to new tax enforcement and collection 
techniques. Simplexity in tax administration will likely only grow as the IRS 
increases its interaction with taxpayers through a variety of new initiatives and 
technological advances. The potential growth of simplexity underscores the 
need for policymakers to consider the strategies of red-flagging, oversight, and, 
if necessary, structural reform,422 when considering whether and how to 
implement these tax administration proposals in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored a previously unexamined consequence of 
mandating that the government communicate with the public using plain 
language that is easy to understand. Plain language advocates assert that 
initiatives such as the Plain Writing Act and the IRS’s duty to explain will lead 
to “simplicity rather than obfuscation.”423 In contrast, we have argued that, 
rather than achieving simplicity, the government’s use of clear and simple 
terms to describe complex legal rules and regulations often yields simplexity. 
By examining this effect of the use of plain language, this Article has made 
four primary contributions. 
First, this Article has introduced the concept of simplexity to the legal 
literature. As we have defined it, simplexity occurs when the government 
presents clear and simple explanations of the law without highlighting its 
underlying complexity or reducing this complexity through formal legal 
changes. Conversely, simplicity—a perennial goal of policymakers and 
scholars—results when policymakers reform the law by eliminating specific 
complex provisions or procedures through the enactment of statutory changes 
or issuance of regulations. 
Second, this Article has shown that in its numerous taxpayer publications, 
the IRS frequently uses plain language to transform complex, often ambiguous 
 
 421 For current law, see Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1471-3(b), (c) (2015). 
 422 See supra Part III.D. 
 423 SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 16. 
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tax law into seemingly simple statements that: (1) present contested tax law as 
clear tax rules, (2) add administrative gloss to the tax law, and (3) fail to fully 
explain the tax law, including possible exceptions. While IRS simplifications 
often result in restatements of the tax law that benefit the government, at other 
times they appear as recharacterizations that benefit taxpayers. 
Third, this Article has considered the normative implications of simplexity. 
Simplexity offers a number of tax administration benefits, such as making the 
tax law understandable, revealing IRS interpretations of the tax law, and even 
bolstering the IRS’s ability to collect tax revenue. At the same time, we have 
argued that simplexity can also promote opacity rather than transparency 
regarding the tax law and lead to inequitable benefits and burdens among 
different taxpayers who act on IRS simplifications. Further, administrative law 
is unlikely to address each of these threats. Evaluating whether the level of 
simplexity is too high or low requires balancing the competing values of 
understandability and accuracy in a given context. 
Last, rather than advocating for the rejection of plain language in 
government communications, we have presented several strategies for 
maximizing the tax administration and compliance benefits of simplexity while 
minimizing its potential threats. While these possibilities are not exhaustive, 
we have outlined three potential approaches: red-flagging or annotating IRS 
simplifications, outside review of IRS simplifications, and accompanying red-
flagging or annotating with structural reform of taxpayer service functions of 
the IRS. 
While we have argued that simplexity occurs in IRS communications with 
taxpayers, and is likely to increase in the future, this concept has broad 
application. Administrative agencies throughout the federal government are 
now required to use plain language in their official communications with the 
public.424 When agencies meet this mandate by offering simple explanations 
for otherwise complex law, they too exhibit simplexity. As a result, the 
analysis and prescriptions presented in this Article should have important 
implications not only for government officials and scholars specializing in tax 
law, but for those in other legal areas as well. 
 
 
 424 Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-274, 124 Stat. 2861 (2010); SUNSTEIN, supra note 13.  
